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Abstract
We study the problem of discrete distribution testing in the two-party setting. For example, in the
standard closeness testing problem, Alice and Bob each have t samples from, respectively, distributions
a and b over [n], and they need to test whether a = b or a, b are -far (in the `1 distance) for some fixed
 > 0. This is in contrast to the well-studied one-party case, where the tester has unrestricted access to
samples of both distributions, for which optimal bounds are known for a number of variations. Despite
being a natural constraint in applications, the two-party setting has evaded attention so far.
We address two fundamental aspects of the two-party setting: 1) what is the communication
complexity, and 2) can it be accomplished securely, without Alice and Bob learning extra information
about each other’s input. Besides closeness testing, we also study the independence testing problem,
where Alice and Bob have t samples from distributions a and b respectively, which may be correlated;
the question is whether a, b are independent of -far from being independent. Our contribution is
three-fold:
• Communication: we show how to gain communication efficiency as we have more samples,
beyond the information-theoretic bound on t. Furthermore, the gain is polynomially better than
what one may obtain by adapting one-party algorithms.
For the closeness testing, our protocol has communication s = Θ˜
(
n2/t2
)
as long as t is at
least the information-theoretic minimum number of samples. For the independence testing over
domain [n]× [m], where n ≥ m, we obtain s = O˜(n2m/t2 + nm/t+
√
m).
• Lower bounds: we prove tightness of our trade-off for the closeness testing, as well as that the
independence testing requires tight Ω(
√
m) communication for unbounded number of samples.
These lower bounds are of independent interest as, to the best of our knowledge, these are the
first 2-party communication lower bounds for testing problems, where the inputs represent a set
of i.i.d. samples.
• Security: we define the concept of secure distribution testing and argue that it must leak at least
some minimal information when the promise is not satisfied. We then provide secure versions of
the above protocols with an overhead that is only polynomial in the security parameter.
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1 Introduction
Distribution property testing is a sub-area of statistical hypothesis testing, which has enjoyed continuously
growing interest in the theoretical computer science community, especially since the 2000 papers [GR00,
BFR+00]. One of the most basic problems is closeness testing, also known as the homogeneity testing
or two sample problem; see [Gut89, Sha11, Unn12]. Here, given two distributions a, b and t samples
from each of them, distinguish between the cases where a = b versus a and b are -far, which usually
means ‖a − b‖1 > .1 For this specific problem, the extensive research lead to algorithms with optimal
sample complexity [BFR+00, Val11, BFR+13, CDVV14, DK16, DGPP16], including when the number
of samples from the two distributions is unequal [AJOS14, BV15, DK16]. Further research directions
of interest include obtaining instance-optimal algorithms, which depend on further properties of the
distributions a, b [ADJ+11, ADJ+12, DK16], quantum algorithms [BHH11], as well as algorithms whose
output is differentially-private [DHS15, CDK17, ASZ17, ADR17]. An even larger body of work studied
numerous related problems such as independence testing, among many others. We refer the reader to the
surveys [Gol17, Can15, Rub12, Rub06] for further references.
Focusing on testing two distributions, such as in the closeness problem, a very natural aspect has,
surprisingly, evaded attention so far: that such a testing task would be often run by two players, each
with access to their own distribution. Specifically, Alice has samples from the distribution a, Bob has
samples from the distribution b, and they need to jointly solve a distribution testing problem on (a, b).
This is a natural setting that models many of the envisioned usage scenarios of distribution testing, where
different parties wish to jointly perform a statistical hypothesis testing task on their distributions. For
example, [Sha11] describes the scenario where two distinct sensors need to test whether they sample from
the same distribution (“noise”) or not.
This 2-party setting raises the following standard theoretical challenges, neither of which has been
previously studied in the context of distribution testing:
• What is the communication complexity of the testing problem? In particular, can we do better
than the straightforward approach, where Alice sends her samples to Bob who then runs an offline
algorithm? Can we prove matching communication lower bounds for such testing problems?
This aspect parallels the quest for low memory or communication usage for hypothesis testing on a
single distribution, initiated in the statistics community [Cov69, HC70] and [AC86, Han87, A+98].
• Is it possible to design a distribution testing protocol that is secure, i.e., where Alice and Bob do
not learn anything about each other’s samples, besides the mere fact of whether their distributions
are same or -far?
While more modern, this question is highly relevant in today’s push for doing statistics that is more
privacy-respecting.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we initiate the study of testing problems in the two-party model, and design protocols which
are both communication-efficient and secure. We do so for two basic problems on pairs of distributions
(i.e., where the two-party setting is natural): 1) closeness testing, and 2) independence testing.
Our main finding is that, once the number of samples exceeds the information-theoretic minimum,
we can obtain protocols with polynomially smaller communication than the na¨ıve adaptation of exist-
ing algorithms. We complement our protocols with lower bounds on the communication complexity of
such problems that are near-optimal for closeness testing, as well as for independence in an intriguing
1This is equivalent to saying that the total variation distance is more than /2.
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parameter regime. Our upper and lower bounds on communication are novel even without any security
considerations.
To argue security, we also put forth a definition for secure distribution testing in the multi-party
model. Our definition differs from the standard secure computation setting due to two unique features
of the considered setting. First, this is “testing” and not “computing”; second, the function of interest is
defined with respect to distributions, but the inputs that the parties use in the computation are samples.
These features do not come into play if the distributions satisfy the promise (e.g., they are either identical
or -far), in which case the security guarantee matches the standard cryptographic one (no information
is leaked beyond the output). However, the crux is when the promise is not satisfied, in which case we
need to allow for some information on the parties’ samples to be leaked by the protocol. Our definition
permits leakage of at most one bit in this case, and leaks nothing when the promise is satisfied. See the
formal definition and discussion in Section 5.
Closeness Testing. In the 2-party closeness testing problem 2pCTn,t,, Alice and Bob each have access
to t samples from some distributions respectively a, b over alphabet [n]. Their goal is to distinguish
between a = b and ‖a− b‖1 ≥  with probability ≥ 2/3.
We first give a non-secure near-optimal communication protocol, and then show how to make it secure
with only a small overhead (polynomial in the security parameter). Our secure version is based on the
existence of a PRG that stretches from polylog(m) bits to m bits, and of an OT protocol with polylog
communication. We elaborate on these standard cryptographic assumptions in a later section. Overall,
we prove the following theorem.
Theorem (Closeness, Secure; see Theorem 5.4). Fix a security parameter k > 1. Fix n > 1 and  ∈ (0, 2),
and let t be such that t ≥ C · k ·max (n2/3 · −4/3,√n · −2) for some (universal) constant C > 0. Then,
assuming PRG and OT as above, there exists a secure distribution testing protocol for 2pCTn,t, which
uses O˜k
(
n2
t24
+ 1
)
communication.
To contrast the communication bounds of our protocol to the classic 1-party setting, consider what
happens in the extreme settings of the parameters s, t, for a fixed . When t ≈ Θ(n2/3), the communication
is O˜(n2/3) as well, i.e., Alice may as well just send all the samples over to Bob. However the communication
decreases as the players have more samples. This may not be surprising given the testing results with
unequal number of samples [BV15, DK16]: indeed, Alice can send ≈ max{n/√t,√n} samples to Bob,
and Bob can run the tester. In contrast, our protocol obtains a polynomially smaller complexity, ≈
n2/t2, whenever t  n2/3. Intuitively, considering the extreme of t  n, we can obtain near-constant
communication: with so many samples, we can learn the distribution, and then use sketching tools, such
as the `1 sketching algorithm of [AMS99, Ind06].
We prove a near-tight lower bound on the above communication complexity trade-off (even without
security considerations) in Section 4. We note that this lower bound differs from standard communication
complexity lower bounds as the players’ inputs are i.i.d. samples and not worst-case.
Theorem (Closeness lower bound; see Theorem 4.1). Any two-way communication protocol for 2pCTn,t,1/2
requires s = Ω˜
(
n2
t2
)
communication.
Independence Testing. The second problem we consider is the independence testing problem in the
2-party model, denoted 2pITn,m,t,. Let p = (a, b) be some joint distribution over [n]× [m], where n ≥ m,
and for i ∈ [t], let ζi be a sample drawn from p. Now we provide Alice with the first coordinates of ζi’s
and Bob with the second coordinates. Alice and Bob’s goal is to test whether p is a product distribution
or -far from any product distribution. We prove the following:
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Theorem (Independence, Secure; see Theorem 6.1). Fix a security parameter k > 1. Fix  ∈ (0, 2), 1 ≤
m ≤ n, and let t be such that t ≥ C ·k ·(n2/3m1/3−4/3 +√nm/2), for some (universal) constant C, and
assuming OT, there is a secure distribution testing protocol for 2pITn,m,t, using O˜k
(
n2·m
t24
+ n·m
t4
+
√
m
3
)
bits of communication.
We note that the lower bound on t from the above theorem is necessary as it is the information-
theoretic bound, as proven in [DK16].
An important qualitative aspect of the communication complexity for 2pIT is that, when the number
of samples t → ∞, the protocol uses Θ˜(
√
m) bits communication. This is in contrast to 2pCT, where
the communication becomes poly-logarithmic for t → ∞. Indeed, we show that Ω(√m) communication
is necessary for one-way communication for 2pIT. Since our non-secure protocol can be made one-way
(see Remark 6.6), this lower bound is tight for one-way protocols. We conjecture that the bound on s
from the above theorem is near-tight in n,m, t for 2-way communication protocols, even without security.
Theorem (Independence lower bound; see Theorem 7.1). For n, t ∈ N, any one-way protocol for
2pITn,n,t,1 requires Ω(
√
n) bits of communication.
1.2 Related work
Our work bridges three separate areas and models: distribution testing, streaming/sketching, and secure
computation. There’s a large body of work in each of these areas, and we mention the branches most
relevant to us.
Distribution Testing. The most basic problem for distribution testing is identity testing: where one
distribution (say, a) is fixed/universal (e.g., uniform). There is a large body of work on this problem for
general a, starting with [BFF+01]; see surveys [Gol17, Can15, Rub12]. As this problem is fundamentally
about one unknown distribution a, we do not consider it in the 2-party model.
For the closeness testing problem, in addition to the aforementioned references, we highlight the
result of [DK16] (see also [Gol16]), whose techniques are the starting point of our protocols. That
result introduces a clean framework for testing, by reducing `1 testing to `2 testing and checking if two
distributions are the same or -far from each other with respect to the `2 norm.
The independence testing problem has been studied in [BFF+01, LRR13, ADK15, DK16]. In the
standard setting (1 party) the problem is defined as: given samples from a distribution pi over pairs with
marginals a, b, determine whether a, b are independent (pi = a × b) or pi is -far from being a product
distribution. This line of work culminated in the work of [DK16], who show the tight sample complexity
of Θ(
√
nm/2 + n2/3m1/3/4/3), where n ≥ m are the cardinalities of the two sets.
Other related questions include: testing over d-tuples of distributions [LRR13, LRR14, ADK15,
DK16], testing independence of monotone distributions [BKR04], and testing k-wise independence [AAK+07,
RX10, RX13]. To what extent the samples–communication trade-off from this paper extend to these
problems is an interesting open question.
Connection to communication and sketching. As already alluded to, our 2-party testing setup
turns out to be connected to sketching. In particular, for the closeness problem, when the number of
samples is t ≈ n, Alice and Bob can approximate respectively a, b (up to small `1 distance), and then
just estimate ‖a− b‖1 using `1 sketching such as [Ind06], using constant communication.
More generally, the 2-party communication model is intimately connected to the streaming model,
where the input is streamed over, while keeping small extra space for computation. Most relevant here
is the work where the input is randomized in some way — this is similar to our setting, where the input
consists of samples from a distribution. This includes the recent work on stochastic streaming [CMVW16],
where the input is generated from a distribution. In particular, [CMVW16] analyze the space complexity
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for estimating the `2 norm of a probability distribution a given t samples presented as a stream. They
show a trade-off between space s and number of samples t ≥ √n of s · t = O˜(n). They also show this is
tight under a likely conjecture on the space complexity of estimating frequency moments in the random
order streaming model.
For the independence problem, two variants were studied in the streaming model in [IM08, BO10]. In
the first variant, termed centralized model, we stream over pairs ζ = (x, y), which implicitly define a joint
distribution (a, b), and need to compute the distance between the joint distribution and the product-of-
the-marginals distribution. Space complexity of this version is (logn)O(1) [BO10]. The second variant,
termed distributed model, is more similar to ours: we stream over items (t, i, p), where t is the time (index)
of a sample (xt, yt) ∼ (a, b) and i ∈ [n] is either xt (if p = 1) or yt (if p = 2), and the goal is again to
estimate the distance between (a, b) and product distribution. For the latter problem, [IM08] show the
complexity is between Ω(n) and O˜(n
2).
In the context of connections between communication complexity and property testing, we also men-
tion the work of [BBM12, BCG16]. They use communication tools to prove lower bounds on the sample
complexity of testing problems. Their techniques however do not readily apply to proving communication
complexity of (distribution) testing problems as we do here.
Testing and learning in distributed and streaming models. Communication lower bounds are
also often related to those in the streaming and distributed models, which have received recent focus
in the context of testing and learning questions. In particular, streaming (as a memory constraint) was
considered as early as in [Cov69, HC70], for distribution (hypothesis) testing of one distribution. In recent
years, a lot of attention has been drawn to streaming (memory) lower bounds for learning problems, such
as parity learning [Raz16, Raz17, KRT17, MM17, GRT18]. These results also show a trade-off between
number of samples and space complexity.
Another recent avenue is to study such problems in the distributed model, where there are many
symmetric players, each with a number of i.i.d. samples from the same distribution. For learning problems
(e.g., parameter or density estimation), see, e.g., [BGM+16, DGL+17, DS18]. We note that since learning
is a much harder problem, typically proving lower bounds is easier (e.g., as shown in [DGL+17], merely
communicating the output requires Ω(n) communication). In contrast, for testing problems, the output is
just one bit. For testing problems, see the recent (independent) manuscript [ACT18], who studies testing
of one distribution, and focuses on reducing the communication per sample (from a max of O(log n)).
None of the lower bounds from the above papers seem to be relevant here as they become vacuous for a
2-party setting. Indeed, when two players have two set of samples from the same distribution, then purely
doubling the sample set of a player trivializes the question (she can solve it without communication).
Secure approximations. Our results on secure distribution testing can also be seen in the context of
the area of secure computation of approximations. This is a framework introduced by [FIM+06], allowing
to combine the benefits of approximation algorithms and secure computation. This was considered
in different settings [FIM+06, HKKN01, BCNW08, IW06, BHN09, IMSW09, KMSZ08], but the most
relevant to us is private approximation of distance between two input vectors. In particular, for `2
distance, Alice and Bob each have a vector a, b ∈ Rn and want to estimate ‖a−b‖2, without revealing any
information that does not follow from the `2 distance itself. For this problem, [IW06] show that secure
protocols are possible with only poly-logarithmic communication complexity. They also specifically look
into the private near-neighbor problem and its approximation. We use some of their techniques in our
secure protocols.
Approximation and testing have a similar flavor in that they both trade accuracy for efficiency, in
different ways (computing an estimate of the solution in the former case, and computing the correct
output bit if the promise is satisfied in the latter). The security goals are also similar (prevent leakage
beyond the intended output). One important difference is that the intended output in secure testing is
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just the single bit of whether or not the test passed. Thus, for example, when approximating a distance
function, even a secure protocol can leak any information that follows from the distance. In contrast,
when testing for closeness, if the inputs are either identical or far, the protocol may only reveal this fact,
but no other information about what the distance is.
Security and privacy of testing. While we are not aware of any work on secure testing, several
recent papers address differentially-private distribution testing [DHS15, CDK17, ASZ17, ADR17]. Here
the privacy guarantee relates to the value of the output after the computation is concluded, requiring it
to be differentially-private with respect to the inputs. Our notion of security for distribution testing is
different, in the same way that secure computation is different from differentially private computation.
While differential privacy (DP) is concerned with what the intended output may leak about the inputs
(even if the input came from a single party or the computation is done by a trusted curator), secure 2-
party computation is concerned with how to compute an intended output without leaking any information
beyond what the output itself reveals. The difference in goals also results in the difference that DP testing
privacy guarantees are typically statistical in nature and provide a non-negligible adversarial advantage,
while secure testing protocols rely on cryptographic assumptions and provide negligible advantage.
More recently, a more stringent model of Locally Differentially Private Testing was proposed [She18,
ACFT18]. This model provides a stronger notion of differential privacy, where users send noisy samples
to an untrusted curator, and the goal is to allow the curator to test the distribution of user inputs (for
some property) without learning “too much” about the individual samples. For LDP, the main goal is to
optimize the sample complexity as a function of the privacy guarantees. While this notion of privacy also
incorporates some privacy of the individual inputs, it is much closer to DP than to our security notion. In
addition, both DP and LDP do not provide sub-linear communication (in the sample size, as we achieve
here). In fact, their goal is to allow O(1) communication per sample, with minimal sample overhead. In
contrast, our protocols provide security “nearly for free” while allowing for faster communication with
more samples. Finally, in the case of independence testing, our work assumes samples are distributed
between the parties who need to test the joint distribution, while in the aforementioned work, each data
point contains full sample information.
We also mention the work of [MNS11] on sketching in adversarial environments, which considers
another threat model: here the two parties performing the computation are honest (and trust each
other), but their (large) input arrives in a streaming fashion chosen adversarially, and they may only
maintain a sketch of the inputs.
1.3 Our Techniques
We now outline the techniques used to establish our main results. Since our overall contribution is
painting a big picture of the 2-party complexity of distribution testing problems, we appeal to a number
of diverse tools. First, we design communication-efficient protocols whose communication improves as we
have more samples. Second, we show that some of the established trade-offs are near-optimal by proving
communication complexity lower bounds on the considered problems, which are near-tight in some of
the parameter regimes. Third, we show how to transform our protocols into secure protocols, under
standard cryptographic assumptions, without further loss in efficiency. All three of these contributions
are independently first-of-a-kind, to the best of our knowledge.
Communication-efficient protocols. We start by noting that we can reduce the testing problem under
the `1 distance (total variation distance) to the same problem under the `2 distance, using now-standard
methods of [DK16, CDVV14]. Although this reduction introduces a few complications to deal with, our
main challenge is actually testing under the `2 distance.
Closeness testing (2pCT) is technically the simpler problem, but it already illustrates some phenom-
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ena, in particular, how to leverage a larger number of samples to improve communication. To estimate
the `2 distance between the 2 unknown distributions, we compute the `2 distance approximation between
the given samples of these distributions. In order to approximate the latter in the 2-party setting, we use
the `2 sketching tools [AMS99]. The crux is to show that we can tolerate a cruder `2 approximation if we
are given a larger sample size. Since the complexity of (1 +α)-approximating the `2 distance is Θ(1/α
2),
we obtain an improvement in communication that is quadratic in the number of samples.
Independence Testing (2pIT) is more challenging since any distance approximation would need to be
established based on the distribution(s) implicitly defined via the joint samples, split between Alice and
Bob, and hence our approximation techniques above is not sufficient. Instead, we develop a reduction
from a large, [n]× [m], alphabet problem, to a smaller alphabet problem, which can be efficiently solved
by communicating fewer samples. This is accomplished by sampling a rectangle of the joint alphabet,
and showing that such a process, when combined with the split-set technique from [DK16], generates
sub-distributions (defined later) which satisfy some nice properties. We then show one can test the
original distribution p = (a, b) over a “large” domain of size [n]× [m] for independence by distinguishing
closeness of 2 simulated distributions pˆ, qˆ, defined on a smaller domain of size [l] × [m], where l =
Θ˜(n
3m/t3 +n2m/t2 + 1). We show it is possible for Alice and Bob to simulate joint samples from pˆ and
qˆ using O(1) communication per sample, after they have down-sampled letters from one of the marginals.
The trade-off on communication–vs–samples emerges from two compounding effects: 1) balancing the
size of the target rectangle with the expected number of available samples over such rectangle; and 2)
the additional advantage from a tighter bound on the `2 norm of qˆ. Each of the above independently
generates linear improvement in communication with more samples. The latter advantage, however, is
helpful only while t = O(n), and therefore we benefit from quadratic improvement in that regime, and
linear improvement thereafter.
Lower bounds on communication. We note that the lower bounds on communication of testing
problems present a particular technical challenge: for testing problems, the inputs are i.i.d. samples from
some distributions. This is more akin to the average-case complexity setup, as opposed to “worst case”
complexity as is standard for communication complexity lower bounds.
We manage to prove such testing lower bounds for the Closeness Testing problem (2pCT). While
our lower bound is, at its core, a reduction from some “hard 2-party communication problem”, our main
contribution is dealing with the above challenge. One may observe that a “hard 2-party communication
problem” is hard under a certain input distribution (by Yao’s minimax theorem), and hence a reduction
algorithm would also produce a hard distribution on the inputs to our problem. However, apriori, it
is hard to ensure that the resulting input distribution resembles anything like a set of samples from
distributions a, b. For example, the inputs may have statistical quirks that actually depend on whether
it is a “close” or “-far” instance, which a reduction is not able to generate without knowing the output.
Indeed, this is the major technical challenge to overcome in our reduction.
At a high level, the role of the “hard problem” is played by a variant of the well-known two-way
Gap Hamming Distance (GHD) problem [CR12, She12]. The known GHD lower-bound variants are
insufficient for us precisely because of the above challenge—we need a better control over the actual
hard distribution, and in particular, for the a = b instance, we need the GHD input vectors to be at
some fixed distance. Therefore, we study the following Exact GHD variant: given x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, with
‖x‖1 = ‖y‖1 = n/2, distinguish between ‖x − y‖1 = n/2 versus ‖x − y‖1 ∈ [n/2 + β, n/2 + 2β]. We
show there exists some β ∈ [Ω(√n), O(√n log n)] for which communication complexity must be Ω˜(n), by
adapting the proof of [She12]. We note that such a lower bound is far from apparent even in the 1-way
communication model (in contrast to the standard GHD, whose 1-way lower bound follows immediately
from the Indexing problem).
Using one instance of Exact GHD, our reduction performs a careful embedding of this hard instance
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into the samples from distributions a, b, while patching the set of samples to look like i.i.d. samples from
the two distributions. While we don’t manage to get the output of the reduction to look precisely like
i.i.d. samples from a, b, our reduction produces two sets of size Poi(t) whose distribution is within a small
statistical distance from the distribution of two set of samples that would be drawn from two distributions
a and b which are either “equal” (when ‖x− y‖1 = n/2) or “far” (when ‖x− y‖1 ∈ [n/2 + β, n/2 + 2β]).
We note that an immediate corollary of our lower bound is an alternative proof that Ω˜(n2/3) samples
are necessary to solve closeness testing (in the vanilla testing setting), albeit the resulting bound is off
by polylogarithmic factors from the best known ones [CDVV14, DK16].
For Independence testing (2pIT), we focus on the lower bound for unbounded number of samples,
which is a bit simpler to deal with as it becomes a “worst-case problem” (worst-case input joint distribu-
tions (a, b)). We are able to show such a hardness result under one-way communication only. Our Ω(
√
m)
lower bound uses the Boolean Hidden Hypermatching (BHH) problem [VY11]. From a single BHH hard
instance, we generate an unbounded number of sample pairs (Ai, Bi), where the samples are drawn from
some joint distribution p = (a, b). Depending on the BHH instance, p is either exactly product or far
from product distribution.
We conjecture that our entire trade-off for the Independence problem is tight. The proof of this
conjecture would have to overcome the above challenge of lower bounds for statistical inputs, for finite t.
Securing the communication protocols. Once low-communication insecure protocols have been
designed, one may try to convert the protocols to secure ones using generic cryptographic techniques.
The latter includes various techniques for secure two-party computation ([Yao82] and followup work),
fully homomorphic encryption ([Gen09] and followup work), or homomorphic secret sharing ([BGI16,
BGI17]). However, a na¨ıve application of such techniques will blow up the communication bounds to
be at least linear in the input size (which is prohibitive in our context), as well as possibly requiring
strong assumptions, a high computation complexity, or not being applicable to arbitrary computations.
The constraint of low-overhead, combined with other considerations, requires design of custom secure
protocols.
Our starting point is a technique that falls into the latter category: secure circuits with ROM [NN01],
a technique that can transform an insecure 2-party protocol to a secure one with a minimal blow-up in
communication, and uses a weak assumption only (OT). In order to obtain an efficient protocol, however,
it only applies to computations expressible via a very small circuit, whose size is proportional to the
target communication, with access to a larger read-only-memory (ROM) table. Thus, the main challenge
becomes to design two-party testing protocols that fit this required format.
For Closeness Testing (2pCT), we begin with our low-communication non-secure protocol, and adapt
it to be secure by designing a small circuit. One of the main difficulties in designing such a circuit is that,
in the `1- to `2-testing reduction, Alice and Bob need to agree on an alphabet, which depends on their
inputs, without compromising the inputs themselves. To bypass this, and other issues, we allow Alice and
Bob to perform some off-line work and prepare some polynomial-size inputs (in ROM). First, we devise
a method for Alice and Bob to generate a combined split set S (discussed later) by having each of Alice
and Bob contribute sampled letters to S. Second, we securely approximate the `2 distance of Alice and
Bob’s original, un-splitted samples using techniques from [IW06]. Finally, we adjust our approximation
by accounting for some small number of letters which differ from the original alphabet or which cannot be
approximated efficiently. To allow for such adjustment to be easily accessible by a bounded-size circuit,
Alice and Bob prepare inputs for all possible scenarios. The main focus of our analysis goes into proving
our construction adds only poly-logarithmic factors in communication over the non-secure protocol. Our
adapted secure algorithm turns out to deviate significantly from the simpler, non-secure 2pCT algorithm;
hence we present the two protocols separately.
For Independence Testing (2pIT), the main challenge is in designing the communication-efficient
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(insecure) protocol, while adapting it to a secure one is somewhat simpler. One challenge is to securely
accomplish the aforementioned alphabet reduction (as the randomness, together with the final output,
might compromise Bob’s input). We address this issue by having the entire process of sampling a sub-
distribution and pairing of samples to be done over a secure circuit. The sampled alphabet, however,
might be too large to communicate, and to overcome this obstacle, we devise a method for sampling from
the non-empty letters of Alice in a way that is distributed as if we would be sampling directly over the
entire alphabet. For this problem, the insecure and secure protocol are more similar, and therefore we
directly describe the secure version.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. Throughout this paper we denote distributions in small letters, and distribution samples in
capital letters. Unless stated otherwise, any distribution is on alphabet [n], and domain elements of [n]
are addressed as letters. In addition, whenever discussing secure protocols, we denote distributions as
a, b, and for generic settings as p, q. Similarly, secure vectors of distribution samples are denoted as A,B
while generic ones are denoted as X,Y .
We also denote any multiplicative error arising from approximation as 1+α, and any error or distance
of/between distributions as . Unless stated otherwise, distance and norms are referring to the Euclidean
distance and `2 norms.
Split Distributions. We use the concept of split distributions from [DK16] to essentially reduce testing
under `1 distance to testing under `2 distance.
Definition 2.1. Given a probability distribution p on [n] and a multiset S of items from [n], define the
split distribution pS on [n+ |S|] as follows. For i ∈ [n], let ai be equal to 1 plus the number of occurrences
of i in S; note that
∑n
i=1 ai = n+ |S|. We associate the elements of [n+ |S|] to elements of the set E =
{(i, j) : i ∈ [n], 1 ≤ j ≤ ai}. Now the distribution pS has support E and a random draw (i, j) from pS is
sampled by picking i randomly from p and j uniformly at random from [ai].
Recall from [DK16] that split distributions are used to upper bound the `2 norm of an underlying
distribution while maintaining its `1 distance to other distributions:
Fact 2.2 ([DK16]). Let p and q be probability distributions on [n], and S a given multiset of [n]. Then
• We can simulate a sample from pS or qS by taking a single sample from p or q, respectively.
• ‖pS − qS‖1 = ‖p− q‖1.
Lemma 2.3 ([DK16]). Let p be a distribution on [n]. Then: (i) For any multisets S ⊆ S′ of [n], ‖pS′‖2 ≤
‖pS‖2, and (ii) If S is obtained by taking Poi(m) samples from p, then E[‖pS‖22] ≤ 1/m.
We provide further preliminaries needed for the secure versions of our protocols in Section 5.1.
3 Closeness Testing: Communication-Efficient Protocol
In this section we consider the closeness testing problem 2pCT, focusing first on the 2-party communi-
cation complexity only. In Section 5, we modify the protocol to make it secure.
As mentioned in the introduction, one way to obtain a protocol is to use unequal-size closeness testing,
where Alice has s samples and Bob has t samples: Alice just sends her s samples to Bob, and Bob invokes
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a standard algorithm for closeness testing. Using the optimal bounds from, say, [DK16], we get the
following trade-off for fixed : s = O˜(n/
√
t), with the condition that s, t ≥ √n.
Here we obtain a polynomially smaller communication complexity, s = O˜(n
2/t2), whenever t is above
the information-theoretic minimum on the number of samples. In Section 4, we show a nearly-matching
lower bound.
3.1 Tool: approximation via occurrence vectors
Our protocol uses the framework introduced in [DK16], allowing us to focus on the `2 testing problem.
For `2 testing, we show that, for two discrete distributions p, q, we can approximate their `2 distance by
approximating the `2 distance of their respective sample occurrence vectors, defined as follows.
Definition 3.1. Given t samples of some distribution p over [n], we define the occurrence vector X ∈ [t]n
such that Xi represent the number of occurrences of element i ∈ [n] in the sample set.
The following lemma bounds how well we need to estimate the `2 distance between occurrence vectors
in order to distinguish between p = q vs. ‖p− q‖1 ≥ . Overall it shows that the more samples we have,
the less accurate the `2 estimation needs to be. Using the framework from [DK16], for now it is enough
to assume that the `2 norm of both p and q is bounded by U < 1.
Lemma 3.2. Let p, q be distributions over [n] with ‖p‖2 , ‖q‖2 ≤ U for some U < 1. There exists a
constant C > 0, such that for t = O(U · n · −2), and α = Ω(U), given ∆ which is (1 ± α)-factor
approximation of ‖X − Y ‖22 where X,Y represent the occurrence vectors of t samples drawn from p, q
respectively, then, using ∆, it is possible to distinguish whether p = q versus ‖p− q‖1 >  with 0.8
probability.
The actual distinguishing algorithm is simple: for fixed α = Ω(U), we merely compare ∆ to some
fixed threshold τ (fixed in the proof below). The intuition is that for a given number of samples, we
have some gap between the range of possible distances ‖X − Y ‖22 for each of the cases. If the number of
samples is close to the information-theoretic minimum [CDVV14], then the gap is minimal and we need
to calculate almost exactly the distance, hence approximating the distance between occurrence vectors
doesn’t help. However, as the number t of samples increases, so does gap between the ranges, and we
can afford a looser distance approximation.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Given t = O(U/′2) samples from each p, q, according to [CDVV14, Proposition
3.1], the estimator
√∑
i(Xi−Yi)2−Xi−Yi
t is a max{′, ‖p− q‖2 /8} additive approximation of ‖p− q‖2 with
0.9 probability. Setting ′ = /8
√
n, we get that:
‖p− q‖2 = 0⇒ ‖X − Y ‖22 ≤
2t2
4n
+ 2t
‖p− q‖2 > /
√
n⇒ ‖X − Y ‖22 ≥
32t2
4n
+ 2t
Suppose ∆ is such that ∆‖X−Y ‖22
∈ (1− α, 1 + α). If ‖p− q‖1 = 0, then ‖p− q‖2 = 0 and hence
∆ ≤ (1 + α)(
2t2
4n
+ 2t) ≤ t(
2t
4n
+ 2 + 2α+
α2t
4n
);
and if ‖p− q‖1 > , then ‖p− q‖2 > /
√
n and hence
∆ ≥ (1− α)(3
2t2
4n
+ 2t) ≥ t(3
2t
4n
+ 2− 2α− 3α
2t
4n
).
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We distinguish the two cases, by comparing ∆ to τ = 
2t2
2n + 2t: namely p = q iff ∆ ≤ τ . Hence we just
need to ensure that
t(
32t
4n
+ 2− 2α− 3α
2t
4n
)− τ ≥ τ − t(
2t
4n
+ 2 + 2α+
α2t
4n
)
Hence we need that 
2t
4n − 2α − 3α
2t
4n ≥ 0, or α ≤ 
2t
4n·(2+32t/4n) . Since t = O(Un
−2), the conclusion
follows.
3.2 Communication vs number of samples
We now provide a (non-secure) protocol for 2pCT with a trade-off between communication and number
of samples.
Theorem 3.3 (Closeness, insecure). Fix n > 1 and  ≤ 2. There exists some constant C > 0 such that
for all t ≥ C ·max (n2/3 · −4/3,√n · −2), the problem 2pCTn,t, can be solved using O˜ ( n2t24 + 1) bits of
communication.
The protocol uses Lemma 3.2 as the main algorithmic tool and proceeds as follows. Bob generates
multi-set S using samples from b and sends S to Alice. Then, Alice and Bob each simulates samples
from aS and bS respectively, and they together approximate the `2 difference of the resulting occurrence
vectors using sketching methods [AMS99].
Non-Secure 2pCT(a, b, t)
Alice’s input: t samples from a
Bob’s input: t samples from b
1. Fix α = Ω(t · 2/n).
2. Bob generates multi-set S using Poi( n
2
t24
) samples from b.
3. Bob sends S to Alice.
4. Alice and Bob recast their samples as being from distributions aS , bS (see Def. 2.1), and
set AS , BS to be the respective occurrence vectors.
5. Alice and Bob each estimate ‖aS‖2 and ‖bS‖2 up to factor 2; if the two estimates are not
within factor 4, output “-FAR”;
6. Alice and Bob approximate ∆ = ‖AS −BS‖22 up to (1 + α) factor, using, say, [AMS99].
7. If ∆ is less than τ = 
2t2
2n + 2t output “SAME”, and, otherwise, output “-FAR”.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We note that, according to Lemma 2.3, E[‖bS‖22] = t24/n2 and hence ‖bS‖22 =
O(t24/n2) with at least 90% probability. Furthermore, since t = Ω(
√
n/2), we have that |S| = O(n)
with high probability. From now on, we condition on these two events.
If ‖aS‖2 6= Θ(‖bS‖2) then distributions are different and we output “-far” is step 5. Otherwise, we
have that ‖aS‖22 = O(‖bS‖22) = O(t24/n2). Hence we can use Lemma 3.2, where U = O(t2/n) and
α = Ω(U), to claim the correctness of the protocol.
We now analyze the communication used by the protocol:
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1. communicating S takes |S| log n = O˜(n2/t24) bits with high probability.
2. estimating ∆ up to approximation 1 + α takes O˜(1/α2) = O˜(n2/t24) bits, using standard `2
estimation algorithms [AMS99, KOR00].
Remark 3.4. Another application of this protocol is that it can be simulated by a single party to obtain
space-bound steaming algorithm with the same space/sample trade-offs. While we are not formalizing this
argument in this paper, this can essentially be done by storing S and sketching ‖AS −BS‖22.
4 Closeness Testing: Communication Lower Bounds
We now prove that the protocol for 2pCT from Section 3 is near-tight, showing the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Let a, b be some distributions over alphabet [n], where Alice and Bob each receive Poi(t)
samples from a, b respectively, for t ≤ n/ logc n for some large enough c > 1. Then any (two-way)
communication protocol Π that distinguishes between a = b and ‖a− b‖1 ≥ 1/2 requires s = Ω˜(n2/t2)
communication.
Intuitively, our proof formalizes the concept that in testing distributions for closeness, “collisions is
all that matters”, even in the communication model. This is similar to the intuition from the “canonical
tester” from [Val11], which shows a similar principle when all the samples are accessible. Our result can
be seen to extending it to saying that the canonical tester is still the best even if we have more-than-
strictly-necessary number of samples that we could potentially compress in a communication protocol.
To prove the theorem, we rely on the following communication complexity lower bound, which is a
variant of the GapHamming lower bound [CR12, She12]. A somewhat surprising aspect of this GapHam-
ming variant is that, unlike for the standard GapHamming, we are not aware of a lower bound for one-way
communication that would be simpler than the two-way proof from the lemma below.
Lemma 4.2. Let n ≥ 1 be even. There exists some β = β(n) ∈ [Θ(√n),Θ(√n log n)], satisfying
the following. Consider a two-way communication protocol A that, with probability at least 0.9, for
x, y ∈ {0, 1}n with ‖x‖1 = ‖y‖1 = n/2, can distinguish between the case when ‖x − y‖1 = n/2 versus
‖x− y‖1−n/2 ∈ [β, 2β]. Then A must exchange at least Ω( nlogn·log logn·log log logn) bits of communication.
The proof of this lemma is presented in Appendix A.
Now the idea is to reduce an instance of the GapHamming input from Lemma 4.2 to an instance of
closeness testing by carefully molding the input (x, y) into a couple of related occurrence vectors (A,B).We
use the following estimate on the statistical distance between Multinomial and Poisson random variables.
Definition 4.3. Consider n, k ≥ 1, as well as a vector ~p ∈ Rk+, where
∑k
i=1 pi ≤ 1. Then let
(M1, . . .Mk) = Mult-0(n; ~p) be the k-dimensional random variable obtained by drawing a Multinomial
random variable with parameters n and probability vector (1−∑ki=1 pi, ~p), and dropping the first coordi-
nate.
Theorem 4.4 ([Bar88]). Let n, k ≥ 1, as well as a vector ~p ∈ Rk+, where p =
∑k
i=1 pi ≤ 1. Consider
the random variable (M1, . . .Mk) to drawn from the Multinomial Mult-0(n; ~p). Also consider the Poisson
random variable P = (P1, . . . , Pk) where Pi ∼ Poi(npi). Then the variables M = (M1, . . .Mk) and
(P1, . . . Pk) are at a statistical distance of O(p log n).
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Proof of Theorem 4.1. Consider some input vectors x, y, of length m = n
2
t2 log3 n
, to the GapHamming
problem from above. Let ∆ = β(m) = Ω(
√
m), and δ = 12(‖x − y‖1 − m/2) ∈ {0} ∪ [∆/2,∆]. The
case of δ = 0 will correspond to “same” case (i.e. a = b), and δ ∈ [∆/2,∆] — to “far” case (i.e.
‖a− b‖1 ∈ [1/2, 1]).
Fix d = n/10 and l = C · t · log n (where C is some constant that we shall fix later), which have the
following meaning: each distribution a, b has half mass over [d] items uniformly (called dense items), and
the other half on [l] items uniformly (called large items). When a = b, these are the same items, and
when a 6= b, the large items are the same while the dense items have supports with a large difference.
In particular, the dense items are supported on sets SA, SB respectively, with |SA| = |SB| = d, and
SA ∩ SB = d · ∆−δ∆ ; we hence also have that |SA \ SB| = d · δ∆ .
Now for i ≥ 0, let D(i) = Pr[Poi(t/2d) = i], i.e., probability that a dense number is sampled i
times. For simplicity, we write D(i, j) = D(i) · D(j). Similarly we define L(i) = Pr[Poi(t/2l) = i] and
L(i, j) = L(i) · L(j). We also set k = Θ(log n), which should be thought of as an upper bound on the
count of any fixed item (with high probability).
The algorithm constructs the occurrence vectors A,B iteratively as follows. We note that all random
variables are chosen using shared randomness. Let mc = m/4−∆.
1. For each i, j ∈ {1, . . . k}, and for each letter c ∈ [n], we generate Poi( d∆ ·D(i, j)) copies of letter c:
Alice replaces 1 with i and Bob replaces 1 with j (both leaving 0s intact);
2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . k}, generate Poi(d ·D(i, 0)) pairs (i, 0), and similarly-distributed number of pairs
(0, i);
3. For each i, j ∈ {1, . . . k}, generate Poi(l · L(i, j)−mc · d∆D(i, j)) pairs (i, j);
4. For each i ∈ {1, . . . k}, generate Poi(l · L(i, 0) − m4 · d∆
∑k
j=1D(i, j)) pairs (i, 0), and similarly-
distributed number of pairs (0, i).
5. Fill in the required number of (0, 0) pairs so that A,B have length precisely n;
6. Randomly permute the letters of A,B (using shared randomness).
Claim 4.5. All the Poisson random variables from above are properly defined—in particular, they have
positive argument.
Proof. We only need to prove this for steps 3 and 4 as the other ones are obvious. Indeed, for i, j ≥ 1:
l · L(i, j) = t log n · (Ω(1/ log n))i+j = t/ log n · (Ω(1/ log n))i+j−2,
whereas,
mc · d∆D(i, j) = O(
√
m · n · (t/2d)i+j) ≤ n2
t log1.5 n
·O(t2/n2) · (O(t/n))i+j−2 ≤ t
log1.5 n
(O(t/n))i+j−2.
Thus l · L(i, j)−mc · d∆D(i, j) ≥ 0 for all i, j ≥ 1.
Similarly, for step 5, for i ≥ 1, we have:
l · L(i, 0) = Ω(t · (O(1/ log n))i−1),
whereas,
m/4 · d∆
∑
j≥1
D(i, j) ≤ O(√m · n ·
∑
j≥1
(O(t/n))i+j) ≤ O( n2
t log1.5 n
· (O(t/n))i+1) ≤ O( t
log1.5 n
· (O(t/n))i−1).
We again have l · L(i, 0)−m/4 · d∆
∑
j≥1D(i, j) ≥ 0 as required.
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We now prove the core of the reduction: that the distribution of (A,B) is close to occurrence vectors
of Poi(t) i.i.d. samples from (a, b), such that a = b if ‖x− y‖1 = m/2, and similarly, ‖a− b‖1 ≥ 1/2 when
‖x− y‖1 ≥ m/2 +β. We will prove that, for distribution of (co-)occurrences of large items is nearly same
in the two instances; and similarly for the dense items.
We partition the coordinates of (x, y) in the following four groups, each corresponding to either
occurrences of dense or large items:
• large: mc = m/4 − ∆ coordinates for each of (1, 1) and (0, 0) coordinate pairs (i.e., coordinates
i ∈ [m] where (xi, yi) = (1, 1) or (xi, yi) = (0, 0));
• large: m/4 coordinates for each of (1, 0) and (0, 1) pairs;
• dense: ∆− δ coordinates for each of (1, 1) and (0, 0) pairs;
• dense: δ coordinates for each of (1, 0) and (0, 1) pairs.
Note that this accounts for all coordinates for a pair x, y such that ‖x− y‖1 = m/2 + δ.
We now analyze the distribution of occurrences/collisions for each of large and dense items in the
generated vectors (A,B), and show that, for each of large/dense items, the distribution is same as if
these are occurrences of items coming from distributions a, b defined above. In particular, for, say, large
items, we consider the distribution of counts ci,j , where i+ j > 0, where ci,j is the number of large items
which where sampled i times on Alice’s side and j times on the Bob’s side; we will refer to them as
(i, j) occurrence pairs. We then show that, the distribution of (ci,j)i+j>0 in (A,B) is Poisson-distributed,
whereas, if it were the occurrence pairs vector of samples drawn from a, b, then the distribution is a
Multinomial. We then use Theorem 4.4 to conclude that the two distributions are statistically close.
Note that the identify of items is not important, as the items are randomly permuted inside the domain,
for both A,B as well as in distributions a, b.
Large items in (A,B). We analyze the large items first. We use the fact that sum of Poisson
distributions is again Poisson. For any i, j ∈ {1, . . . k}, the number of large (i, j) pairs is distributed as:
Poi(mc · d∆D(i, j)) (from the first step: there are mc coordinate pairs (1, 1)), plus Poi(l ·L(i, j)−mc · d∆ ·
D(i, j)) (from the third step). Thus the number of large (i, j) pairs is distributed as Poi(l · L(i, j)).
Similarly, say, considering occurrence pair (i, 0) (a symmetric argument applies for (0, i)), the number
of large (i, 0) pairs is distributed as Poi(m/4· d∆
∑k
j=1D(i, j)) (from the first step: there arem/4 coordinate
pairs (1, 0)), plus Poi(l ·L(i, 0)−m/4· d∆
∑k
j=1D(i, j)) (from step 4). This again amounts to Poi(l ·L(i, 0)).
Large items in (a, b). Let us now contrast these counts to the one would get from the “real
counts” of the large items in the distribution (a, b) defined as above. The latter is a Multinomial ML =
Mult-0(l; ~pL) where ~pL = (L(i, j))i,j≥0;i+j>0 = (L(1, 0), L(0, 1), L(1, 1), L(2, 0), L(2, 1), ...). We now can
use Theorem 4.4, to conclude that the the TV-distance between ML and the distribution Poi(l · ~pL)
is bounded by: O(log n) ·∑i,j≥0;i+j>0 L(i, j) ≤ O(log n) ·∑i,j≥0;i+j>0(t/2l)i+j ≤ O(1)/C ≤ 0.01 (by
choosing C to be a large enough constant).
Dense items in (A,B). Let’s analyze the distribution of dense items now. For i, j ≥ 1, the
distribution of the number of (i, j) dense occurrence pairs is Poi((∆ − δ) · d∆D(i, j)) as there are ∆ − δ
coordinate pairs (1, 1). Now consider the case of (i, 0) occurrence pairs of dense items, for i ∈ [k]. Their
count is distributed as: Poi(δ · d∆
∑k
j=1D(i, j)) (from the first step: there are δ coordinate pairs (1, 0)),
plus Poi(d ·D(i, 0)) (from the second step). This amounts to:
Poi(d · δ∆
k∑
j=1
D(i, j) + d ·D(i, 0)).
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Dense items in (a, b). Again, let’s compare these counts to the “real counts” that would occur for
the distributions (a, b). The latter distribution can be thought of as three distributions: corresponding to
items in SA ∩SB, to items in SA \SB, and items in SB \SA. The occurrence counts for items in SA ∩SB
are distributed as a Multinomial MD,i with parameters |SA ∩ SB| = d · ∆−δ∆ and probability vector ~pD =
(D(i, j))i,j≥0;i+j>0. By Theorem 4.4, the TV-distance between MD,i and the distribution Poi(d · ∆−δ∆ ·~pD)
is bounded by: O(log n) ·∑i,j≥0;i+j>0D(i, j) ≤ O(log n) ·∑i,j≥0;i+j>0(t/2d)i+j ≤ O(1/ log n).
Note that the counts for i, j ≥ 1 correspond to (1,1) pairs generating dense items in A,B above.
It remains to analyze the case of j = 0 or i = 0. Wlog, consider j = 0 and i > 0 (ie, items that are
only in Alice’s distribution). For the distributions a, b, the occurrence pairs (i, 0) are distributed as a
Multinomial MD,a = Mult-0(|SA \ SB|; ~pDA), where ~pDA = (D(i))i≥1. By Theorem 4.4, the TV-distance
between MD,a and Poi(d · δ∆ · ~pDA) is at most O(log n) ·
∑
i≥1D(i) ≤ O(1/ log n). Summing up with
the above, and focusing on (i, 0) pairs, their distribution in (a, b) is at small distance to the distribution
where each pair (i, 0) is distributed as:
Poi(d·∆−δ∆ ·D(i, 0)+d· δ∆ ·D(i)) = Poi(d∆−δ∆ ·D(i, 0)+d δ∆ ·(D(i, 0)+
k∑
j=1
D(i, j))) = Poi(d· δ∆ ·
k∑
j=1
D(i, j)+d·D(i, 0)).
Thus we conclude that the distribution of occurrence pairs of the dense items in vectors A,B matches,
up to a small total variation distance, the distribution for a, b as described above.
This completes the proof of the lower bound.
5 Closeness Testing: Secure Communication-Efficient Protocols
The protocol from Section 3 is clearly not secure (for example, Bob sends Alice his multi-set S, which
reveals information about his input). In this section we show how to modify the protocol to make it
secure, relying on standard cryptographic assumptions. Before proceeding, we provide some preliminaries,
followed by our general definition for secure computation of distribution testing.
5.1 Cryptographic Tools and Preliminaries
We briefly review cryptographic tools and assumptions that we use. We keep the discussion largely
informal, and focus on the aspects most relevant to our results. We refer the reader to, e.g., [Gol01, Gol04]
for more details and formal definitions of standard primitives.
PRG, OT, and Our Assumptions. A pseudorandom generator (PRG) is a deterministic function
G that stretches its input length, such that if the input is selected uniformly at random, the output is
indistinguishable from uniform for an appropriate class of distinguishers.
In particular, the first cryptographic assumption that our secure protocols rely on, is that there exists
a PRG G that can stretch polylog(m) bits to m bits, and fools poly(m)-sized circuits. By default, this is
what we mean when we refer to “PRG” in the rest of the paper.
A 1-out-of-m Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol, allows one party holding input i ∈ [m] and another
party holding s ∈ {0, 1}m, to engage in a protocol where the first party obtains as output the bit si, the
other party obtains no output, and no further information about s or i is leaked to the parties.
The second cryptographic assumption that our secure protocols rely on, is that there exists a 1-out-
of-m OT protocol with communication complexity polylog(m). By default, this is what we mean when
we refer to “OT” in the rest of the paper.
We note that it is easy to extend a 1-out-of-m OT protocol operating on bits (as we defined above) to
one that operates on words of size r (namely, with s ∈ {{0, 1}r}m), paying a communication overhead that
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is linear in r. Hence, under our OT assumption, there is such a protocol with communication complexity
that is polylogarithmic in m and linear in r.
PRG and OT are both standard cryptographic primitives, that can be instantiated from various
concrete number theoretic assumptions. The fact that we require super polynomial stretch for the PRG
means that we need to assume subexponential hardness (and this is also the reason that we don’t use the
OT assumption to generically obtain PRG, as we only need OT with polynomial hardness).
We note that if we wish to weaken the assumptions, we may assume polynomial-stretch PRG (from
input of size mδ to output of size m for a constant δ) and sublinear-communication OT (1-out-of-m
OT with communication complexity mδ). Under these weaker assumptions, our secure protocols may
incur higher communication complexity, but would still provide meaningful results (and remain secure).
Specifically, under a weaker PRG assumption, our protocols would remain sub-linear always and would
in fact keep the same complexity for part of the trade-off range. Under a weaker OT assumption, our
protocols would remain sub-linear at least for some range of δ and t (the number of samples).
Secure Computation. Intuitively, secure computation allows two or more parties to evaluate some
function of their inputs, such that no additional information is revealed to any party (or group of parties)
beyond what follows from their own inputs and outputs.
Defining Security: Simulation Paradigm. Secure computation has been studied in many different
settings. The idea underlying the security definition in all these settings, is trying to enforce that whatever
the adversary can do in the real-world, can also be achieved in an ideal world, where the parties simply
give their input to a trusted party, who hands them the output. Defining this formally is complex and
various issues arise in different settings.
In this paper we focus on the simplest setting of a semi-honest (or “honest-but-curious”) adversary,
where the parties follow the protocol faithfully, but try to use their transcripts to glean more information
than intended. Our defintions and protocols can be adapted to malicious adversary using standard
techniques [GMW86, NN01, Gol04].
In our setting, if semi-honest Alice and Bob want to compute a function f : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1},
the definition of security boils down to requiring the existence of an efficient simulator for each party,
which can simulate the view of the party (their input and transcript), from just the party’s input, random
input, and output.
Modular Composition. At times it is convenient to design a protocol in a modular way, where the
computation of a function f may invoke a call to another function g. We will denote by Πgf a protocol
computing f , with oracle gates to the function g. A composition theorem [Can00, Gol04] proves that if
the protocol Πgf is a secure protocol for f , and Πg is a secure protocol for g, then taking Π
g
f and replacing
the oracle calls to g with an execution of Πg results in a secure protocol Πf for f (which doesn’t make
any oracle calls).
Feasibility Results. Starting with [Yao82], a large body of work has shown that any function that
can be computed, can be computed securely in various settings. In particular, two parties holding inputs
x and y can securely evaluate any circuit C(x, y) with communication Ok(|C|) (where k is the security
parameter), under mild cryptographic assumptions. Note that this communication complexity is at least
linear (since the circuit size is at least as large as the size of input and output), while we will need sublinear
communication protocols. Other general techniques for secure function evaluation, where communication
does not depend on the circuit size, include fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) ([Gen09] and follow up
work, see [Bra18] for a survey), and homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) [BGI16, BGI17]. However, these
transformations still require communication that is linear in the length of input and output (prohibitive
in our context). They also require stronger assumptions, and (for FHE) require a high computational
overhead, or (for HSS) only apply for restricted classes of circuits. Naor and Nissim [NN01] showed a
15
general way to transform insecure protocols to secure ones, while preserving communication. However,
in general this may introduce an exponential blowup in computation, which again will not be sufficient
for our needs.
While a naive application of these generic methods doesn’t directly work for us, we will make use
of another result by Naor and Nissim, adapting secure two party computation techniques to allow for
communication-efficient protocols whenever the computation can be expressed as a (small) circuits with
(large) ROM.
Secure Circuit with ROM. Consider the setting where each party has a table R ∈ ({0, 1}r)m (that
is, m entries of size r each). Now consider a circuit C that, in addition to usual gates, has lookup gates
which allow to access any of the parties’ ROM tables (on input i ∈ [m] the gate will return the r-bit
record at the requested party’s R(i)).
Theorem 5.1. [NN01] If C is a circuit with ROM, then it can be securely computed with O˜(|C| ·T (r,m))
communication, where T (r,m) is the communication of 1-out-of-m OT on words of size r.
Thus, under our OT assumption, a circuit with ROM can be securely evaluated with communication
complexity that is linear in |C| and |r|, but polylogarithmic in m. We will rely on this theorem in both
of our secure distribution testing constructions. Note that the main remaining challenge is to design the
protocol that can be expressed in a form where this theorem can be applied.
Sampling an Orthonormal Matrix. We will use the following fact from [IW06], proven in the
context of providing a secure approximation of the `2 distance.
Theorem 5.2. [IW06] Suppose we sample a random orthonormal n × n matrix R (from a distribution
defined by the Haar measure) but instead generate our randomness using a PRG G, rounding its entries
to the nearest multiple of 2Θ(K), where K = Θ(k). Then we have for all x ∈ [t]n:
Pr
[(
1− 2−K) · ‖x‖22 ≤ ‖Rx‖2 and ∀i(Rx)2i < ‖x‖22n K
]
> 1− neg(k).
We note that the only place where we use a PRG in our constructions, is in order to be able to apply
this theorem (in order to be able to obtain shared randomness with low communication, our parties will
share a seed of a PRG that they will expand and use to sample).
5.2 Defining Secure Computation for Distribution Testing
Defining security for a distribution testing protocol requires some care, due to two new features that do
not come up in the standard setting of secure computation of a function: first, this is “testing” and not
“computing”, and, second, the function of interest is defined with respect to distributions, but the inputs
that the parties use in the computation are samples. Before providing our formal definition, we discuss
these issues and our choices.
A testing problem can be described as a partial boolean function g, with the goal of computing g(x)
whenever g is defined on the given input x (e.g, when the input consists of two distributions that are
either identical or -far). If the input x is such that g(x) is not defined (we will refer to this as an input
in the gray zone), the property testing definition (and literature) does not care about whether the output
is 0 or 1. Indeed, this flexibility of having a gray zone with no correctness requirement imposed on it is
precisely what allows for more efficient testing algorithms.
In contrast, for security purposes, we must care about what the protocol outputs when the input is in
the gray zone, as this may reveal information about the inputs. Specifically, standard secure computation
notions require that each party learns nothing beyond what follows from their own input and output.
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For a protocol testing some property, when the output g(x) is defined, we can (and will) follow this
paradigm. When the input is in the gray zone and g is not defined, it is tempting to require that the
protocol reveals this fact and no other information about the input. However, it’s easy to see that such
a protocol in fact is a secure computation of a complete function (where for each input x the protocol
outputs whether g(x) = 0, g(x) = 1, or g(x) is undefined). We could instead require that for inputs
in the gray zone, the output of the protocol is some distribution over {0, 1}, independent of the input.
But such a protocol again is in fact computing some complete function of the input, which intuitively
defeats the point of using testing (versus computing) to gain efficiency. This intuition suggests that secure
testing of any property (namely, secure computation of a partial function) cannot be achieved with better
efficiency than secure computation of a (very related) complete function. We do not attempt to formalize
(or refute) this intuition here.
Instead, we show that, for our more special case of secure distribution testing, some information must
be leaked in the gray zone, even if one disregards efficiency considerations. Indeed, consider a closeness
testing setting where Alice and Bob inputs are t samples from a and b (respectively) over [n] which
are either (a, b) = (a0, a0), or (a, b) = (a0, b) for some distributions a0, b with ‖a0 − b‖1 = . Any
correct protocols must have different outputs on such instances with, say, probability 0.99. Now define
aˆ = δ · a′ + (1− δ) · a for δ = 0.0001/t, where a′ is a defined on a new, unique set of letters; Clearly, the
distribution of t-sample inputs from (a, b) and (aˆ, bˆ) are the same (for each instance), except with 0.0001
probability, and therefore the distribution over Alice and Bob views (and in particular, the output) in
the latter case must be statistically close to the first one, and hence differ with at least 0.98 probability.
However (aˆ, bˆ) in both (a0, a0) and (a0, b) instances are in the gray zone. It is therefore not possible to
simulate Alice’s view of Π in any statistically significant manner without additional information (besides
the mere fact the distance is in the grey zone).
Following the above, we define a protocol to be a secure computation of a testing task (or partial
function) g(x), if it is a secure computation of some (complete, possibly randomized) function f(x), where
f(x) = g(x) whenever g(x) is defined; when g(x) is not defined, f(x) is some function of the input x.
Thus, each party learns nothing beyond what follows from their own input and the output f(x) (which
means there’s some leakage f(x) in the gray zone, but no leakage beyond the testing output when the
testing promise holds). We will require f to be a boolean function, so that the leakage in the gray zone is
at most one bit of information about the input (we will also mention other possible generalizations of this
definition). Finally, we note that for distribution testing, the function g is defined on the distributions,
but the actual inputs of the parties are samples. This is not a major distinction for correctness, as with
sufficiently many samples we can typically obtain the correct result with high probability. However, for
security, the leakage f necessarily applies to the samples (our only access to the distributions), and not
the distributions themselves.
We are now ready to provide our definition of secure computation of distribution testing.
Definition 5.3. Let D be a set of input distributions over×di=1[ni], and let g : D → {0, 1} be a partial
boolean function, defined on a subset P ⊆ D (with g(p) = ⊥ whenever p ∈ D \ P ).
Let pi be a d-party protocol, and let k be a security parameter. We say that pi is a t-sample secure
distribution testing protocol (for the testing task defined by g), if there exists a boolean function f :
{×di=1[ni]}t → {0, 1} such that the following holds:
Correctness: for any p ∈ P ,
Pr
ζ1...ζt∼i.i.d p
[f(ζ) = g(p)] = 1− neg(k)
Security: For any ζ ∈ {×di=1[ni]}t, if we give each player i ∈ [d] the input (1k, ζ1(i), . . . , ζt(i)), then
protocol pi is a secure computation of the function f(ζ).
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We note that the security condition can be instantiated with any standard secure computation notion.
In this paper we focus on the semi-honest model, although malicious security can be obtained by a
standard transformation with low communication overhead.
More General Variants of Secure Distribution Testing. The definition can be naturally extended
in various ways. We may allow non-boolean f (more bits of leakage), relax the requirement that f = g
whenever g is defined (allowing additional leakage even if the promise holds), or impose restrictions on
f based on which leakage is deemed more or less reasonable.2 We may also generalize the scope of
distribution testing tasks modeled by the definition (e.g., we may allow one party to get more samples
than the other, or give one party a complete description of a distribution rather than samples). For
simplicity and ease of exposition, we do not develop these extensions here, and stick with the simpler
definition above.
5.3 Secure Closeness Testing Protocol
We now describe a secure distribution testing protocol that achieves the same communication complexity
as the insecure protocol from Section 3, up to poly-logarithmic factors. Specifically, we show the following
theorem:
Theorem 5.4 (Closeness, Secure). Fix a security parameter k > 1. Fix n > 1,  ∈ (0, 2), and let t be
such that t ≥ C · k · max (n2/3 · −4/3,√n · −2) for some (universal) constant C > 0. Then, assuming
PRG and OT, there exists a secure distribution testing protocol for 2pCTn,t, which uses O˜k
(
n2
t24
+ 1
)
communication.
The high level approach is similar to that of the previous protocol, in that we also estimate the squared
`2 distance between samples drawn from split distributions aS and bS , for some split-distribution set S, to
distinguish between a = b and ‖a− b‖1 ≥ . One challenge in securing the protocol is that we would like
Alice and Bob to agree on an alphabet (and specifically, use the same split-distribution set S) without
compromising their inputs. To address this, Alice and Bob will run a secure computation over a circuit
of size O˜k,(n
2/t2 + 1) which simulates samples from the split distribution instead of communicating the
set S.
The main idea is to approximate the distance of the unsplitted occurrences vectors A and B (repre-
senting samples drawn from a and b), and “manually” add the difference between the unsplitted and the
splitted distance for each i ∈ S. That means, the protocols will:
1. Approximate ‖A−B‖22;
2. Add exactly ‖AS −BS‖22 − ‖A−B‖22;
There is however an issue with this approach: ‖A−B‖22 might be much larger than ‖AS −BS‖22, and
therefore the summation of (1) + (2) above might not be a good enough approximation of ‖AS −BS‖22.
To overcome this issue, we first define the notion of “capped” vectors as follows:
Definition 5.5 (Capped Vectors). For X ∈ Rn, we define X ′ ∈ Rn to be the ’capped vector of X with
threshold L’ iff ∀i ∈ [n], X ′i = min(L,Xi).
Now, instead of approximating ‖A−B‖22, we will approximate “capped” versions of A,B for some
carefully chosen threshold L termed A′, B′, and show the capped distance is a good–enough approximation
to the splitted distance ‖AS −BS‖22. Our revised plan is therefore:
2Such restrictions would likely be application-dependent and subjective, as a general theory comparing which leakage
functions are qualitatively “better” is an open research area in cryptography.
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1. Approximate ‖A′ −B′‖22;
2. Add exactly ‖AS −BS‖22 − ‖A′ −B′‖22;
Securely Approximating ‖A′ −B′‖22. For this task, we will use the techniques of [IW06]. Recall
the `2 − Approx protocol from [IW06] samples an orthonormal matrix with rounded entries R as per
Theorem 5.2, and samples sufficient coordinates from Rx. To ensure the protocol works correctly, effi-
ciently and securely for all distances, it scans all possible distance magnitudes (termed T ) starting with
the largest possible one and dividing by 2 each time, each time with a new circuit. In our case, however,
we need only to distinguish if an approximation is more than some threshold, so it suffices to run one
ROM sub-circuit with T preselected for such threshold.
Choosing a set S. We also take a slightly different approach for splitting the samples. While
in [DK16] and Section 3, we split the distributions using samples from b only, and show it suffices to
upper bound the `2 norm for only one of the distributions we test by comparing a and b second moment
approximations, here we will upper bound both aS , bS second moments by constructing 2 multisets: Sa
from a and Sb from b and setting S , Sa unionmultiSb (where unionmulti denotes the sum of multiplicities of each element
in Sa and Sb). While not necessary for correctness, this new technique turns out to both simplify our
protocol and improve its security guarantees.
We now show that ‖A′ −B′‖22 = O˜(‖AS −BS‖22):
Lemma 5.6. Let p be distribution on [n], and let X,Y be the occurrence vectors of t1, t2 samples drawn
from p where t2 ≥ t1, then with high probability, we have that for all i ∈ [n], Xi ≤ 50 ln(n) ·max(1, t1t2Yi).
Proof. By the Chernoff bound, for each i ∈ [n] we have either:
1. pi ≤ 1/t1, and then Pr[Xi > 10 ln(n)] ≤ 1/100n2; or
2. pi > 1/t1, and then Pr[Xi > 10 ln(n)t1pi] ≤ 1/100n and Pr[Yi < t2pi/5] ≤ 1/100n2.
so the claim follows the union bound over all coordinates.
Corollary 5.7. Let A,B be the occurrence vectors of t independent samples drawn from each a, b. Let
A′, B′ be capped vectors of A,B with threshold L ∈ [t]. Let Sa, Sb be multisets of independent samples
drawn from a, b of size t/L. Finally, for S , Sa unionmulti Sb, we define AS , BS to be the occurrence vectors
of the t samples encoded into A,B, recasted as being drawn from aS , bS. Then, with high probability:
‖A′ −B′‖22 ≤ 100 ln(n) · ‖AS −BS‖22.
Proof. For each letter i ∈ [n], if both Ai and Bi are larger than L, then LHS is 0. Hence, we will now
assume that Bi < L w.l.o.g..
By Lemma 5.6, we have with high probability for all i ∈ [n]:
1. {i multiplicity in Sb} ≤ 50 ln(n).
2. {i multiplicity in Sa} ≤ 50 ln(n) max(1, Ai/L).
Note that on one hand, since B′i = Bi and A
′
i = min(Ai, L) we have
(A′i−B′i)2
(Ai−Bi)2 ≤
(A′i)
2
(Ai)2
≤ LAi , and on
the other hand, we have that ‖AS(i, ·)−BS(i, ·)‖22 · {i multiplicity in S} ≥ (Ai − Bi)2. By combining
both inequalities we obtain that with high probability, all letters satisfy the equation (A′i − B′i)2 ≤
100 ln(n) · ‖AS(i, ·)−BS(i, ·)‖22 and the corollary follows the summing over all letters.
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Adding ‖AS −BS‖22 − ‖A′ −B′‖22. We note that simulating the splitted samples in AS and BS
can be done independently for each letter i ∈ [n], as AS(i, ·) and BS(i, ·) are (random) functions of the
number of occurrences of the letter i in S, A and B, independently of the other letters. Furthermore, the
vectors AS − BS and A′ − B′ differ in only O(|S|), plus O(t/L) = O(|S|), coordinates. This fact allows
Alice and Bob to prepare simulated samples for all possible multisets in polynomial offline time, and
the secure circuit can look up the correct simulation of AS(i, ·) and BS(i, ·) for each i ∈ S and calculate
‖AS −BS‖22 − ‖A′ −B′‖22 using O(|S|) such lookups.
We define a method for Alice and Bob to prepare a look-up table of simulated samples from split
distributions aS and bS for all possible multisets S of size at most t.
Definition 5.8. Given some occurrences vector X ∈ [t]n, we will define the 3D Split Occurrences Matrix
XSM ∈ [t]n×t×t as the following random process: for any i ∈ [n], j ∈ [t], we will split Xi into j buckets
XSM (i, j, 1), ..., XSM (i, j, j) by recasting each sample to a random bucket uniformly.
We present our protocol next.
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Secure protocol Π for the 2pCT problem
Let ζ be i.i.d. samples from the product distribution p = a× b.
Alice’s Input: 1k, first coordinates of ζ1, . . . , ζt
Bob’s Input: 1k, second coordinates of ζ1, . . . , ζt
Output: 1 if a = b and 0 if ‖a− b‖1 ≥ 
1. Let K = Θ(k), and c is some constant.
2. Let t′ = t/K; L = max(1, t
′3·4
c·n2 ); α = Ω(
√
L/t′); l = Θ(k2 ln2(n)/α2).
3. Alice and Bob exchange the seed of the PRG G, and generate matrix R as in Theorem
5.2.
4. Alice partitions the t samples into K Sample Sets of t′ samples each, and for each Sample
Set prepares ROM entries RA′, ASM ,Ma, XSa as follows:
(a) Generate multi-set Sa using t
′/2L samples from the Sample Set according to Lemma
2.3.
(b) Let XSa be the occurrence vector of Sa
(c) Let A be the occurrence vectors of another t′/2 samples from the Sample Set.
(d) Let A′ be capped vector of A with threshold L.
(e) Let Ma = {i : i ∈ Sa ∨Ai > L}
(f) Let ASM be 3D Split Occurrences Matrix of A.
5. Bob similarly prepares ROM entries RB′, BSM ,Mb, XSb .
6. Alice and Bob run a secure circuit with ROM, CΠ to compute the following function.
(a) For each of the sample sets j ∈ [K]:
i. For i ∈Ma ∪Mb
A. Let mi = 1 +XSa(i) +XSb(i)
B. Let yi =
∥∥ASM (i,mi, ·)−BSM (i,mi, ·)∥∥22 − (A′i −B′i)2.
ii. Compute Oj =
∑
i∈Ma∪Mb yi
iii. Let T = 2(τ −Oj), where τ is the threshold from Lemma 3.2.
iv. Generate random i1, ..., il ∈ [n] and compute d1 = R(A′ −B′)|2i1 , ..., dl =
R(A′ −B′)|2il .
v. Generate z1, ..., zl from independent Bernoulli with biases nd1/TK, ..., ndl/TK.
vi. Let Dj = Oj +
TK
l
∑
i∈[l] zi.
vii. If Dj > τ vote 0; otherwise, vote 1.
(b) Output the majority of the votes from the K tests.
5.4 Protocol analysis
We now prove Theorem 5.4 on the correctness and security of the protocol Π.
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Proof of Theorem 5.4. The proof proceeds in the following steps:
1. First we define a boolean function f(ζ).
2. We show that for p = a × b such that a = b or ‖a− b‖1 ≥ , the function f(ζ) = g(p), whenever
ζ ∼i.i.d p except with negligible probability.
3. Finally, we show that the protocol Π is a secure computation of f(ζ).
We define f(ζ) as follows:
f(ζ)
1. Partition the samples into K Sample Sets ζ1, ..., ζK as per steps 4 and 5 of Π.
2. Compute the majority of the K test results, where a test does the following for each of
the K Sample Sets ζi:
(a) Generate multi-sets Sa, Sb as in the protocol.
(b) Let S = Sa unionmulti Sb.
(c) Generate A,B and calculate A′, B′, AS , BS .
(d) Let ∆1 = ‖AS −BS‖22 − ‖A′ −B′‖22.
(e) Let T = 2(τ −∆1).
(f) Generate z1, ..., zl from independent Bernoulli with bias ‖A′ −B′‖22 /TK.
(g) Let ∆2 =
TK
l
∑l
i=1 zi.
(h) If ∆1 + ∆2 ≥ τ vote 0; otherwise vote 1.
We now show that, whenever a = b or ‖a− b‖1 ≥ , we obtain Prζ1...ζt∼i.i.d. p[f(ζ) = g(p)] = 1−neg(k),
for p = a × b. We show f(ζi) votes correctly for each Sample Set ζi, with high probability. First, one
can see that if ‖A′ −B′‖22 ≥ T then E[zi] ≥ 1/K and, by the Chernoff bound for l ≥ Ω(k2), we have
that ∆2 ≥ τ − ∆1 with 1 − neg(k) probability; the test vote is 0 for this Sample Set. Similarly, if
‖A′ −B′‖22 ≤ T/4, the test votes 1 with 1− neg(k) probability
Otherwise, when ‖A′ −B′‖22 ∈ [T/4, T ], we have that ∆2 is a (1± α/100 ln(n))-factor approximation
of ‖A′ −B′‖22 with 1− neg(k) probability, by the Chernoff bound for l = Ω(k2 · ln2 n/α2).
We now invoke Corollary 5.7, and obtain with high probability that:∣∣∣∆1 + ∆2 − ‖AS −BS‖22∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∆2 − ∥∥A′ −B′∥∥22∣∣∣
≤ α/100 ln(n) · ∥∥A′ −B′∥∥2
2
≤ α · ‖AS −BS‖22 .
It is left to show we have sufficient samples for the vote to be correct with high probability. For that
we use Lemma 2.3 to bound ‖aS‖2 and ‖bS‖2 as follows:
1. We note that |Sa| = |Sb| = t′/2L. Therefore, Sa and Sb contain subsets S′a ⊆ Sa and S′b ⊆ Sb of
size Poi(t′/4L) each, with probability at least 1− 2 (t′/4L)2t′/4L = 1− 2t′/4L = 1− o(1).
2. Therefore, E
[∥∥aS′a∥∥2] ,E [∥∥∥bS′b∥∥∥2] ≤ √4L/t′ and we have both norms O(√L/t′) with probability
0.99, by the Markov bound.
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3. Since S′a, S′b ⊆ S, then ‖aS‖2 , ‖bS‖2 = O(
√
L/t′).
4. Furthermore, as t′ = Ω(
√
n/2), we have |S| = 2t′/L = O(n) by our choice of L.
From now on we assume all the above. According to Lemma 3.2 and Fact 2.2, all we need to make
the test successful with high probability is O(
√
L/t′ · n/2) = O(t′/c + n/√t′2) = O(t′/c + n2/3/4/3)
many samples (since t′ ≥ O(n2/3−4/3). By choosing c to be high enough constant, t′/2 samples suffice
to make the vote correct with high probability. Therefore majority vote over K sample sets amplify such
probability to 1− neg(k).
We’ll now show Π is a secure computation for f(ζ) for any ζ. For correctness, we’ll show that for
all ζ, E[Π(ζ)] − E[f(ζ)] = neg(k). This is sufficient, since both Π and f provide an output in {0, 1} (so
the output expectation is the same as the probability the output equals 1). We’ll first show that for all
sample sets ζ1, . . . , ζK : ∆1 ≡ Oj .
Lemma 5.9. Let AS , BS denote the occurrences vector of simulated samples from aS , bS respectively,
then we have for all sample sets ‖A′ −B′‖22 +Oj ≡ ‖AS −BS‖22
Proof. For any i ∈ [n], let mi = 1 + {i multiplicity in S}. We have either:
(i) i /∈Ma ∪Mb, and then:
(a) (A′i −B′i)2 = (Ai −Bi)2 (since Ai, Bi ≤ L).
(b) ‖AS(i, ·)−BS(i, ·)‖22 = (Ai −Bi)2 (since i /∈ S).
(c) i does not contribute to Oj .
(ii) i ∈Ma ∪Mb, and then:
(a) i contribution to Oj is yi =
∥∥ASM (i,mi, ·)−BSM (i,mi, ·)∥∥22 − (A′i −B′i)2, and∥∥ASM (i,mi, ·)−BSM (i,mi, ·)∥∥22 ≡ ‖AS(i, ·)−BS(i, ·)‖22 .
Therefore, each i contribution to LHS and RHS are equivalent. This concludes the proof.
So we are left to show that Pr[Dj ≥ τ ]−Pr[∆1 + ∆2 ≥ τ ] = neg(k). If we have ‖A′ −B′‖2 > T , then
both events occurring with prob. 1− neg(k). Otherwise, we use Theorem 5.2 and obtain that:
1. With prob. 1− neg(k), ∀i(RA′i −RB′i)2 ≤ TK/n.
2. (1− 2−Θ(K)) ‖A′ −B′‖22 ≤ Ei[n(RA′i −RB′i)2] ≤ ‖A′ −B′‖22.
Therefore, by linearity of expectations and the union bound we obtain that the distribution over the zi
differ by at most neg(k) between f(ζ) and Π(ζ), and therefore the probability to output 0 differ by at
most neg(k).
Next, we show that the protocol Π is a secure computation of f . We note that the only communication
in the protocol is sending is the random seed, followed by the secure circuit computation of the final output,
which is indistinguishable from f(ζ). Moreover, as described above, either Pr[f(ζ) = Π(ζ)] ≥ 1− neg(k)
or the distribution over the zi (for a given seed) differ by at most neg(k). Thus, replacing the secure
circuit CΠ with an oracle computing the output, the simulator (for either Alice or for Bob) outputs its
input, a random seed for G, and the final output, to generate a distribution that is statistically close to
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that in the real-world.
Finally, we analyze the communication complexity of the protocol Π for 2pCT. To analyze the circuit
size of CΠ, one can observe that:
• Computing Oj can be done with a circuit of size O˜(|Ma| + |Mb|) = O˜(t′/L) = O˜( n24·t2 + 1) (by
computing each yi in step 6(a)i using O˜(1) computations).
• Next, computing Dj (with Oj as input) can be done with a circuit of size O˜(l) = O˜k(log2 n ·1/α2) =
O˜k(t
′/L) = O˜k( n
2
t24
+ 1).
• Computing majority over K (sub-)circuits adds multiplicative factor of Θ(k) to the circuit size.
Thus CΠ is of size O˜k
(
n2
t24
+ 1
)
, and the ROM consists of s , poly(n, t, 1/, k) words of size r ,
O˜(1) each. Therefore, the communication complexity of the secure computation of CΠ is |CΠ| · T (r, s),
where T (r, s) is is the communication complexity of 1-out-of-s OT on words of size r. Finally, the total
communication of the protocol Π additionally also includes the length of the seed for G.
Plugging in our OT and PRG assumptions, we obtain the required communication bound (using
Theorem 5.1).
6 Independence Testing: Communication and Security
In this section, we present our protocol for independence testing. To streamline the presentation, we give
directly a secure protocol, noting that obtaining communication-efficiency is the main challenge for this
problem. Overall, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6.1 (Independence, Secure). Fix a security parameter k > 1. Fix  ∈ (0, 2), 1 ≤ m ≤ n,
and let t be such that t ≥ C · k · (n2/3m1/3−4/3 +√nm/2), for some (universal) constant C > 0, and
assuming OT cryptographic assumption, there is a secure distribution testing protocol for 2pITn,m,t,
using O˜k
(
n2·m
t24
+ n·m
t4
+
√
m
3
)
bits of communication.
Note that similarly to 2pCT, our protocol for 2pIT obtains better communication than via the
straight-forward approach of Alice sending its input to Bob, and Bob invoking standard independence
testing algorithm. We show a matching lower bound on communication for t→∞ in Section 7.
We start by providing some intuition behind our protocol, setting up some definitions along the way.
As before, our protocol for 2pIT uses the framework of splitting the distributions to reduce the problem
to testing an `2 distance. While it may seem tempting to reuse the sketching technique to estimate the
`2 distance between the joint distribution and the product of its marginals, this technique does not help
here as this distance cannot be approximated without first combining the samples from Alice and Bob.
To overcome this inherent obstacle, we use an alphabet reduction technique. At a high level, our reduction
samples a random rectangle R of the underlying split distribution alphabet, and tests its distance to the
marginal product distribution. This concept helps us to improve communication in two ways. First,
we obtain better communication as we need to deal with a smaller alphabet problem, and, second, we
can use the additional samples for tighter `2 bound on the smaller alphabet product distribution. Each
of these two improvements achieve linear improvement with more samples and therefore we hope for a
quadratic improvement overall. The latter improvement is only effective while t n samples, and hence
the quadratic improvement kicks in only in that regime.
To formalize the alphabet-reduction idea, we start by making the following definition:
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Definition 6.2. Fix some distribution p over alphabet [n]. For U ⊆ [n] let p|U be the distribution p
conditioned on the set U : i.e., p|U is a distribution over alphabet U such that for any i ∈ U , p|U (j) =
p(j)/
∑
i∈U p(i).
Given joint distribution p = (a, b), let Sa, Sb be the multisets in [n], [m] of samples from a, b respec-
tively. Define the multiset S ⊂ [n]×[m] to be such that 1+{multiplicity of (i, j) in S} = (1+{multiplicity
of i in Sa}) · (1 + {multiplicity of j in Sb}).
Our idea is to sample a rectangle R = Ra × Rb ⊆ [n + |Sa|] × [m + |Sb|], and test the closeness of
the sub-distributions pˆ
∆
= (pS)|R and qˆ
∆
= (aSa)|Ra × (bSb)|Rb . We would like R to satisfy the following
properties:
1. If a is independent of b, denoted a ⊥ b, then pˆ = qˆ, and if a and b are -far from being independent,
then pˆ is at distance Ω() from qˆ.
2. Pri∼p[i ∈ R] is high enough, so that we have sufficient samples to test pˆ and qˆ for closeness.
3. R is sufficiently small to allow small communication.
4. The secure circuit can simulate samples from pˆ, qˆ using O˜(1) ROM look-ups per sample.
We obtain conditions (1) and (2) above by bounding the `2 norm of the underlying product distribution
through splitting, and use such bound also as a bound over the variance of the `1 mass of pˆ and its
distance from qˆ. We analyze such approach in Section 6.2. For condition (4), we only sample Ra ⊆
[n+ |Sa|] (assuming w.l.o.g. n ≥ m), and have Rb be the complete alphabet of Bob [m+ |Sb|]. The final
communication/sample trade-offs are obtained from the best trade-off between conditions (2) and (3).
In order to be able to look-up and “pair” Alice and Bob samples from some rectangle R, we need a
method for storing a table of all indices for each letter. For this, we use the following definition:
Definition 6.3. Given t indexed samples X ∈ [n]t, we define the Indices Set Vector I ∈ (2[t])n such that
I(j) = {i ∈ [t] : Xi = j}.
6.1 Full protocol description
In contrast to closeness testing, the main challenge for the 2pIT problem is designing a communication-
efficient protocol, while adding security introduces relatively minor nuances. Hence, for ease of exposition,
we present the secure version of our protocol directly.
Our overall protocol proceeds as follows at a high level. Alice and Bob first generate multi-sets Sa, Sb.
Alice then simulates one set of indexed samples from aSa (termed A) while Bob simulates two sets of
samples from bSb . First set (termed Bp) is obtained using the sample set corresponding to the set A, and
the second one using a fresh independent sample set (termed Bq). Alice then prepares Indices Set Vector
I of A. Next, a secure circuit with ROM samples a uniform subset U from [n + |Sa|], looks up all of
Alice’s samples coming from U , and generates 2 joint sample sets: the first one by pairing each of Alice’s
samples A with the corresponding sample in Bp (thereby simulating samples from pˆ as defined above),
and then by pairing each of Alice’s samples A with an independent sample from Bq (thereby simulating
samples from qˆ). Finally, those two sets are then being tested (directly) for closeness using Lemma 3.2.
We note that the set U , together with the protocol’s output can possibly compromise Bob’s data, and
therefore we need the secure circuit to compute U (rather than Alice providing it to the circuit). One
challenge with such approach though, is the set U may be larger than the communication bound. Luckily,
we only care about non-empty letters in U which are (in expectation) of small size, and since we sample
U uniformly from [n+ |Sa|], we can overcome the issue by sampling the non-empty letters of U from the
non-empty letters of [n+ |Sa|] (e.g. appears at least once in A). For this we need to define a distribution
over the size of intersection of subsets chosen uniformly:
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Definition 6.4. For n ≥ 1, and α, β ≤ n, we define a discrete distribution called Uniform Subset
Intersection distribution µ(n, α, β) as follows: Fix S to be a set of size n, and S1 ⊆ S of size α. Then
µ(n, α, β)
∆≡ |S1 ∩ S2|, where S2 ⊆ S of size β is chosen uniformly at random.
Claim 6.5. Let S be a finite set of size n ≥ 1, and let S1 ⊆ S of size α. Let S2 be a uniform subset of
S of size β. Finally, let S3 be uniform subset of S1 of size µ(n, α, β). Then S3 ≡ S1 ∩ S2.
Proof. One observe that |S3| = µ(n, α, β) ≡ |S1 ∩ S2| by our definition of µ. Furthermore, since S2 was
chosen uniformly at random, then each element of S1 has equal and independent probability to be part
of S1 ∩ S2, and therefore S1 ∩ S2 is also a uniform subset of S1.
We now present our protocol for 2pIT. As before, our protocol uses a secure circuit with ROM which
will sample from Alice and Bob’s input strings.
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Secure protocol Π for the 2pIT problem
Let ζ1, . . . ζt be i.i.d. samples from the joint distribution p = (a, b).
Alice’s Input: 1k, first coordinates of ζ1, . . . , ζt
Bob’s Input: 1k, second coordinates of ζ1, . . . , ζt
Output: 1 if a ⊥ b and 0 if p is -far from any product distribution.
1. Let K = Θ(k); ′ = Ω(); t′ = min{t/3K,O(n · √m/)}; l = O(max{n3·m
t′34 ,
n2·m
t′24 ,
1
2
}).
2. Alice and Bob partition their samples into 3K Sample Sets of t′ samples each with
corresponding indices termed A1, . . . , A3K , B1, . . . , B3K .
3. For i ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1} Alice prepares ROM entries termed Ai, Ii,Γi as follows:
(a) Generate multi-set Sia using min{t′, n} samples from A3i+1 according to Lemma 2.3.
(b) Let Ai be A3i+2 recasted as being drawn from aSia .
(c) Let Ii be the Indices Set Vector of Ai.
(d) Let Γi = {non-empty letters of Ii}.
4. For i ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1} Bob prepares ROM entries termed Bip, Biq as follows:
(a) Generate multi-set Sib using m samples from B3i+1 according to Lemma 2.3.
(b) Let Bip be B3i+2 recasted as being drawn from bSib
.
(c) Let Biq be B3i+3 recasted as being drawn from bSib
.
5. A secure circuit with ROM(Ai, Bip, B
i
q, Ii,Γi) computes for each i ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1} the
following vote, and then outputs the majority vote:
(a) Compute λ = min{µ(n+ |Sia|, |Γi|, l), 100t′l/n}
(b) Sample U ′ uniformly from Γi of size λ.
(c) Let Ii =
⋃
j∈U ′ Ii(j).
(d) Compute Iip, I
i
q, J
i
p, J
i
q as uniform disjoint subsets of I
i of size min{O(t′l/n), b|Ii|/4c}
each.
(e) Compute Xi1 = {(Ai(j), Bip(j)) : j ∈ Iip}.
(f) Compute Xi2 = {(Ai(j), Bip(j)) : j ∈ J ip}.
(g) Compute Y i1 = {(Ai(j), Biq(j)) : j ∈ Iiq}.
(h) Compute Y i2 = {(Ai(j), Biq(j)) : j ∈ J iq}.
(i) Count collisions in Xi1, Y
i
1 and produce estimations of ‖pˆ‖2 , ‖qˆ‖2 up to factor 2.
Compute χi = 1 if they these estimations agree up to factor 4 and χi = 0 otherwise.
(j) Compute ∆i = ‖X − Y ‖22 where X and Y are the occurrence vectors of Xi2 and Y i2 .
(k) Vote χi ∧ (∆i ≤ τ), where τ is threshold from Lemma 3.2
Remark 6.6. We note that one can obtain a non-secure, 1-round 1-way communication protocol by
having Alice computing the set U of size l(sampled from [n+ |Sia|]), and sending to Bob sufficiently many
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samples coming from U , along with corresponding indices of such samples, while Bob performing the
pairing and testing for closeness as per steps 5.(e), . . . , 5.(k) above.
6.2 Analysis setup: alphabet reduction
Before proceeding to the full protocol analysis, we first argue some auxiliary lemmas, regarding reducing
the larger independence testing problem to a smaller closeness problem which requires less samples and
therefore smaller communication than the original problem. The lemmas state show that sampling sub-
distributions from distributions with bounded `2 norms preserve some important properties.
We first show that if we sample sufficiently large sub-distribution p|U uniformly from some distribution
p with bounded ‖p‖22, then with high probability, p|U has density of the same magnitude as the fraction
of the alphabet we are sampling from, and
∥∥p|U∥∥22 is similarly bounded.
Lemma 6.7. Let p be some distribution over [n] such that ‖p‖22 ≤ U , and let U of size l be a uniformly
random subset of [n]. For l ≥ 100 · U · n we have with 0.95 probability:
1.
∑
i∈U pi = Θ(l/n);
2.
∥∥p|U∥∥22 = O(U · n/l).
Proof. Note that the expectation of (1) is l/n and its variance is at most U · l/n (roughly). Therefore,
by the Chebyshev inequality and the lower bound on l, we have (1) with probability ≥ 0.99.
For (2), we note that
∥∥p|U∥∥22 = ∑i∈U p2i /(∑i∈U pi)2. The numerator is O(U · l/n) in expectation, and
therefore for high enough constant O(U · l/n) with 0.99 probability. The denominator is Ω(l2/n2) by the
above argument.
We now derive by a similar argument that such sampling process also preserves distances.
Lemma 6.8. Let p be some distribution over [n] such that ‖p‖22 ≤ U , and let ∆ ∈ [0, 2]n. Let U of size l
be a uniformly random subset of [n]. If 〈p,∆〉 ≥  and l ≥ O(U · n/2), then we have with 0.9 probability
that: ∑
i∈U pi ·∆i∑
i∈U pi
= Ω().
Proof. By Lemma 6.7, the denominator is Θ(l/n) with 0.95 probability. The expectation of the numerator
is l/n and its variance is at most U · l/n. Therefore, for l ≥ O(U · n/2) (using high enough constant),
the numerator is Θ(l/n) with probability 0.95 by the Chebyshev inequality.
Finally, we show that we can apply the above lemmas to obtain a reduction from testing a distribution
p = [n] × [m], to testing closeness of a smaller sub-distribution (where we down-sample the letters from
[n] and condition on those) to the product distribution.
Lemma 6.9. Let p be a distribution on [n]× [m] and let p1, p2 be its marginals. Fix  < 2. Let U ⊂ [n]
be a random subset of size l, such that l ≥ O(U · n/2) where U = ‖p1‖22. Define pˆ , p|U×[m] and
qˆ , p1|U × p2. There exists ′ = Ω() such that with 0.9 probability,
1. If p is a product distribution, then pˆ = qˆ.
2. If p is -far from any product distribution, then ‖pˆ− qˆ‖1 ≥ ′.
28
Proof. We obtain (1) immediately from the fact p1|U and p2 are the marginals of pˆ.
For i ∈ [n], let ∆i = ‖p(i, ∗)− p2‖1, where p(i, ∗) is the right-marginal of p conditioned on p1 = i.
Since p(i, j) = p(i, ∗)(j) · p1(i), we have that 〈p1,∆〉 = ‖p− p1 × p2‖1. If p is -far from the product
distribution, then 〈p1,∆〉 ≥ . We now invoke Lemma 6.8 using p = p1, and get that with 0.9 probability:∥∥p|U×[m] − p1|U × p2∥∥1 =
∑
i∈U p1(i) ·∆i∑
i∈U p1(i)
= Ω().
6.3 Analysis of the protocol
Proof of Theorem 6.1. The proof proceeds in the following steps:
1. First we define a boolean function f(ζ).
2. We show that for p = (a, b) such that a ⊥ b or p is -far from any product distribution, the function
f(ζ) = g(p), whenever ζ ∼i.i.d p except with negligible probability.
3. Finally, we show that the protocol Π is a secure computation of f(ζ).
For f(ζ), we define f to be the boolean function producing a bit by simulating steps (1), . . . , (5) of
Π(ζ) by Alice and Bob. Indeed, such simplification is possible for 2pIT since the protocol involves no
communication outside of the secure circuit computation.
We now show that, whenever a ⊥ b or p is -far from any product distribution, we obtain Prζ1...ζt∼i.i.d. p[f(ζ) =
g(p)] = 1− neg(k). We prove for each i ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1}, all the below happen with some high constant
probability:
1. Xi1, X
i
2 are distributed as being drawn from pˆ and Y
i
1 , Y
i
2 are distributed as being drawn from qˆ.
2. pˆ = qˆ if a ⊥ b and ‖pˆ− qˆ‖1 ≥ ′ if (a, b) are -far from the product distribution.
3. Xi1, Y
i
1 contain sufficiently many samples to approximate ‖pˆ‖2 , ‖qˆ‖2, and Xi2 and Y i2 contain suffi-
ciently many samples to test the closeness of pˆ and qˆ according to Lemma 3.2.
For (1), we note that |Γi| ≤ t′ and therefore E[µ(n+|Sa|, |Γi|, l)] ≤ t′·l/n and we have λ = µ(n+|Sa|, |Γi|, l)
with 0.99 probability (by Markov). According to Claim 6.5, the process in which the circuit samples U ′
from Γi simulates the process of sampling U of size l uniformly from [n + |Sa|] with U ′ ≡ Γi ∩ U , and
therefore Xi and Y i are distributed as being drawn from pˆ and qˆ.
We obtain (2) with 0.9 probability immediately from Lemma 6.9.
For (3), let us denote tMIN to be the samples required both to meet the conditions of Lemma 3.2, and
to produce a constant factor approximation for ‖pˆ‖2 and ‖qˆ‖2. Let us also denote tREAL to be the actual
samples our protocol produces from pˆ, qˆ in steps 5.(d), . . . , 5.(h) above. Let γ = min{t′, n}. With 1−o(1)
probability, Sa, Sb contain subsets S
′
a ⊆ Sa and S′b ⊆ Sb of sizes Poi(γ/2) and Poi(m/2) respectively.
Therefore, according to Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 6.7:
‖qˆ‖22 =
∥∥aSa|U∥∥22 · ‖bSb‖22 = O( nγl ) ·O( 1m) = O( nγlm)
And therefore:
tMIN = O
(
lm
√
n
γlm
· −2 +
√
lm
)
= O
(√
nlm
γ4
)
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On the other hand we have by Lemma 6.7 with probability 0.95:
tREAL = Ω
(
t′l
n
)
As a result, there exists some constant c for which we obtain tREAL ≥ tMIN with probability 0.95− o(1)
whenever l ≥ cn3m
t′2γ4 = c ·max{n
3·m
t′34 ,
n2·m
t′24 }.
We note as well that ∆i is an exact computation of ‖X − Y ‖22 and therefore can also be considered
(1 + α) approximation of such quantity (for any α).
Last, we need to show l is properly defined, and in particular, l ≤ n + |Sa|. Note that from the
conditions of Theorem 6.1, t′ ≥ C ·O(√nm/2). We thus set C to be a large enough constant such that
l ≤ n holds.
To sum up, we have shown (by the union bound) that for each i ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1}, the conditions
of Lemma 3.2 are met with probability 0.85 − o(1), and therefore f(ζ) votes correctly with probability
1/2 + Ω(1). The final majority output over K votes is therefore correct with 1 − neg(k) probability as
needed.
We’ll now show Π is a secure computation for f(ζ) for any ζ. For correctness, we need show that for
all ζ, E[Π(ζ)]− E[f(ζ)] = neg(k). In fact, those are equal by our definition of f above.
Security follows immediately from the security of the secure circuit with ROM, as there is no additional
communication or randomness in the protocol.
We now analyze the communication complexity of Π. We note all communication is invoked from the
secure circuit in step (5) above. For each of the K (sub-)circuits producing a vote, the circuit first makes
O(1) look-ups for each letter in U ′. The circuit then calculates the number of corresponding sample
indices in Ii and samples O(t′l/n) such indices. One can observe that such sampling process is possible
using a circuit of size O(t′l/n) even with the (low-probability) scenario where there are ω(t′l/n) such
indices since the index sets are disjoint. For each sampled index (in Iip, I
i
q, J
i
p, J
i
q), the circuit invokes O˜(1)
calculations to produce collision count and occurrence vector squared distance. Therefore, the circuit
size is bounded by O˜(λ + t′l/n) = O˜(t′l/n) = O˜
(
n2·m
t′24 +
n·m
t′4 +
√
m
3
)
, and the overall circuit producing
majority vote is just K times that:
O˜k
(
n2 ·m
t24
+
n ·m
t4
+
√
m
3
)
z
By assuming OT , and invoking Theorem 5.1, we obtain the claimed complexity.
7 Independence Testing: Communication Lower Bound
We now show our lower bounds for 2pIT. We show that any one-way protocol requires Ω(
√
m) bits of
communication (regardless of the security properties).
The lower bound result is obtained by reduction from the Boolean Hidden Hypermatching (BHH)
problem from [VY11]. In the BHH problem, Alice is given x ∈ {0, 1}n, and Bob is given some complete
matching M of [n] such that for all pairs (i, j) in the matching: i⊕ j = b ∈ {0, 1}. Bob’s goal to output b
correctly with 2/3 probability. For this problem, [VY11] show that one-way communication complexity
is Ω(
√
n).
Using the above result, we now show the following:
Theorem 7.1. For n, t ∈ N, any one-way protocol for 2pITn,n,t,1,1/3 requires Ω(
√
n) bits of communi-
cation.
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Proof of Theorem 7.1. We show how, for given a BHH instance pb = (x,M), we can reduce it to the
2pITn,n,t,1 problem. Let r ∈ [n]t be some common uniformly random string. In addition, for b ∈ {0, 1},
let Xb = {i ∈ [n] : xi = b}. For each i ∈ [t], Alice, Bob each will generate an indexed sample (Ai, Bi)
respectively as follows:
1. Let b′ = xr(i); Alice samples Ai uniformly from Xb′ .
2. Bob samples Bi uniformly between r(i) and its pair in the matching M .
One can observe that for any i ∈ [t], j ∈ [n], Pr[Ai = j] = Pr[Bi = j] = 1/n, i.e., each of A,B is
distributed uniformly at random from [n]. Thus, if the distributions of A and B are to be independent,
it must be a distribution uniform over [n]× [n].
Now let us analyze the probability distribution of each pair (Ai, Bi): for any i ∈ [t], j ∈ [n], k ∈ [n],
we have (Ai, Bi) = (j, k) iff the following precise conditions hold:
1. xr(i) = xj .
2. r(i) is either k or its pair in the matching M .
3. j was sampled by Alice.
4. k was sampled by Bob.
Events (3) and (4) are independent events which happen with probability 2/n and 1/2 respectively
conditioned on the first 2 events occurring.
For a p1 instance (ie, when the output b = 1), the probability of the first 2 events occurring is 1/n
for any (j, k) (as there is a single letter in [n] that supports both conditions), and therefore for any
i ∈ [t], j ∈ [n], k ∈ [n], we have Pr[(Ai, Bi) = (j, k)] = 1/n2. Hence (A,B) are distributed as a product
distribution.
On the other hand, for a p0 instance, the probability of the first 2 events occurring is 2/n if xj = xk
and 0 otherwise. Thus for any i ∈ [t], j ∈ [n], k ∈ [n], we have that Pr[(Ai, Bi) = (j, k)] is either 0 or
2/n2. This means that we have an instance which is at distance 1 from the product distribution [n]× [n]
(and hence Ω(1) from any distribution).
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A Lower bound for Exact GHD for two-way communication protocols
We prove Lemma 4.2 here. We first prove the following claim.
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Claim A.1. Let n ≥ 1 be even. Let β = β(n) = √n/2/4, and γ = O(√log n). Consider a two-way
communication protocol A that, with probability at least 0.9, for x, y ∈ {0, 1}n with ‖x‖1 = ‖y‖1 = n/2,
can distinguish between the case when ‖x − y‖1 = n/2 versus ‖x − y‖1 − n/2 ∈ [β, γβ]. Then A must
exchange at least Ω(n/ log n) bits of communication.
Proof. We will first prove a lower bound for a related distributional problem, and then show a reduction
from this distributional problem. Consider the distributional problem where, for random x, y ∈ {0, 1}n/2,
a deterministic communication protocol D satisfies the following:
• if ‖x− y‖1 = n/4, the protocol outputs −1 with probability at least 1− 1/100
√
n;
• if |‖x− y‖1 − n/4| ≥ β(n)/2, the protocol outputs +1 with probability at least 1− 1/100
√
n.
We will now show that any such D must use at least Ω(n) bits. We use the results of [She12]. Let
µ be the (joint) distribution on x, y which are uniformly random from {0, 1}n/2. Now define fn/2(x, y)
to be the partial function solved by the above assumed protocol D: −1 if ‖x − y‖1 = n/4, and +1 if
|‖x− y‖1 − n/4| ≥ β(n)/2. Theorem 3.3 from [She12] guarantees that, for any combinatorial rectange
R with µ(R) ≥ 2−δn, for small δ > 0, we have that Pr(x,y)∈R[|‖x− y‖1 − n/4| ≥ β] ≥ 1/4, for β(n) =√
n/2/4. We now use the corruption bound (Theorem 2.3 from [She12]). In particular, we have that
µ(R ∩ f−1n/2(+1)) ≥ 1/4 ≥ 1/4 · µ(R) · µ(R ∩ f−1n/2(−1)). Also, µ(f−1n/2(−1)) ≈
√
2√
pin/2
. Hence we conclude
that the communication complexity of D is at least
δn+ log
(
µ(f−1n/2(−1))− 1/100
√
n
1/4
)
= Ω(n),
where we used the fact that the failure probability of the protocol is ξ = 1/100
√
n µ(f−1n/2(−1)).
It remains to show that the claimed A exists, then there’s also a protocol D. In particular, suppose A
exists. Then consider input strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}n/2 to D, chosen from the uniform distributon µ. Consider
string x′ formed as x, followed by the negation of x; note that ‖x′‖ = n/2. Similarly, construct y′. Note
that ‖x′‖1 = ‖y′‖1 = n/2, and that ‖x′−y′‖1 = 2·‖x−y‖1. With probability at least 1−1/n, we also have
that ‖x′−y′‖1 = 2‖x−y‖1 ∈ [n/2−O(
√
n log n), n/2+O(
√
n log n)], i.e., ‖x′−y′‖1−n/2 ∈ [−γβ(n), γβ(n)].
Hence Alice and Bob can run the protocol A, on inputs x′, y′, to distinguish whether ‖x′ − y′‖1 = n/2
or ‖x′ − y′‖1 − n/2 ∈ [β(n), γβ(n)]; note that this is precisely equivalent to distinguishing between
‖x− y‖1 = n/4 versus ‖x− y‖1 − n/4 ∈ [β(n)/2, γβ(n)/2].
This is not enough though, as fn/2(x, y) = +1 also when ‖x−y‖1 ≤ n/4−β(n)/2. Thus, Alice and Bob
will instead run the protocol A on x′, y′, as well as on inputs x′ and negation of y′. Thus, if ‖x−y‖1 = n/4,
then A will return −1 both times, with probability at least 0.8. If |‖x− y‖1 − n/4| ∈ [β/2, γβ/2], then
A will return +1 at least once, with probability at least 0.9. Hence, we say ‖x− y‖1 = n/4 iff A returns
−1 both times.
The above reduction gives a 0.8 probability of success. We can amplify this to 1−o(1/√n) by running
O(log n) independent copies of the (randomized) protocol reduction from above, and taking the median
answer. This way we obtain a randomized protocol with success probability at least 1 − o(1/√n) in
solving problem fn/2. We can further extract a deterministic protocol D that also achieves a success
probability of 1− o(1/√n).
Overall, we conclude that since D has Ω(n) communication, the protocol A must have Ω( nlogn) com-
munication, since the reduction uses 2 ·O(log n) copies of A.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 4.2.
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Proof of Lemma 4.2. Assume the contrapositive: that for each interval [l, r] with r/l = 2 and l ∈
[Θ(
√
n),Θ(
√
n log n)], there exists a protocol A[l,r] which can distinguish ‖x − y‖1 = n/2 versus ‖x −
y‖1 − n/2 ∈ [l, r] with constant probability, using only ≤ C communication bits. For each such protocol,
we can obtain boosted protocol A′[l,r] whose failure probability is o(1/ log logn) and communication com-
plexity is O(C log log log n) — as usual, by running O(log log log n) independent copies of the protocol
and taking the majority answer.
Now, in Lemma A.1, we have the “far” interval I = [
√
n/2/4,
√
n/2/4 ·Θ(√log n)]. We partition this
interval into q = O(log log n) intervals I1, . . . Iq, where each interval Ii = [li, ri] has ri/li ≤ 2. For each
such interval, we have (by the above) a boosted protocol A′Ii for i ∈ [q].
We now construct a protocol A able to distinguish ‖x − y‖1 = n/2 versus ‖x − y‖1 − n/2 ∈ I. In
particular, we run all protocols A′I1 , . . . A
′
Iq
on the same inputs. If ‖x− y‖1 = n/2, then all of them will
return −1, except with probability ≤ q · o(1/ log log n) = o(1). On the other hand, if ‖x− y‖1 − n/2 ∈ I,
then for i ∈ [q] such that ‖x− y‖1 − n/2 ∈ Ii, the algorithm A′Ii will return +1, except with probability
o(1/ log log n). In other words, in the far case, at least one of the algorithms will return +1, with
probability 1− o(1). Hence we can distinguish these two cases with probability 1− o(1).
The overall communication of A is O(C log logn · log log log n). By Lemma A.1, we conclude that
C = Ω( nlogn log logn log log logn).
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